The Floodgates of Strict Liability: Bursting Reservoirs and the Adoption of Fletcherv. Rylands in the Gilded Age by Shugerman, Jed H
Note
The Floodgates of Strict Liability:
Bursting Reservoirs and the Adoption of
Fletcher v. Rylands in the Gilded Age
Jed Handelsman Shugerman
In the standard historical interpretation of American tort law, the era of
laissez-faire and pro-industry fault liability dominated the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries,' and the mid-twentieth century marked the
gradual rise of strict liability.2 Scholars and judges presenting this narrative
have focused on the reception of Fletcher v. Rylands, an English case from
the 1860s in which a reservoir used for supplying water power to a textile
mill burst into a neighbor's underground mine shafts. In one of the most
significant and controversial precedents in the strict liability canon,4 the
1. E.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW, 409-27 (1973);
MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 85-108 (1977);
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE LAW IN AMERICA 55-59 (1974); G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN
AMERICA 3-19 (1980); Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 515-17 (1961); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Negligence Without Fault, 54
CAL. L. REV. 1422, 1425-43 (1966); Charles 0. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute
Liability, 37 VA. L. REv. 359 (1951); A.W.B. Simpson, Legal Liability for Bursting Reservoirs:
The Historical Context of Rylands v. Fletcher, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 209, 214-16 (1984); cf
Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972) (examining the era of
fault and arguing that fault prevailed as the most economically efficient doctrine). Contra Robert
L. Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation, 15 GA. L. REV.
925, 927 (1981); Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A
Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717, 1720 (1981).
2. See Gregory, supra note 1; William K. Jones, Strict Liability for Hazardous Enterprise, 92
COLuM. L. REv. 1705, 1706-11 (1992); Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The Revitalization of
Hazardous Activity Strict Liability, 65 N.C. L. REv. 257 (1987); Rabin, supra note 1, at 961.
3. 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (Ex. 1865), rev'd, 1 L.R.-Ex. 265 (Ex. Ch. 1866), aff'd, 3 L.R.-E & I.
App. 330 (H.L. 1868).
4. See WILLIAM PROSSER, The Principle of Rylands v. Fletcher, in SELECTED TOPICS ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 135, 135 (1953).
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English courts held that proof of negligence was not required for "non-
natural" or potentially "mischievous" activities.5 Scholars point to a series
of decisions rejecting Rylands to conclude that American courts adhered to
the fault doctrine and repudiated strict liability in the late nineteenth
century, and the consensus has been that Rylands was not accepted until the
mid-twentieth century.6 Many prominent works on American legal history
feature this supposed rejection of Rylands as a centerpiece for their
historical claims about the dominance of the fault doctrine as a subsidy for
emerging industry.7
In fact, a significant majority of the states actually accepted Rylands in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, at the height of the "era of
fault." While New York's highest court famously declared, in Ives v. South
Buffalo Railway' in 1911, that due process of law categorically required
proof of fault, courts around the country had been applying Rylands over
the previous three decades. A few states split on the validity of Rylands in
the 1870s, but a wave of states from the mid-1880s to the early 1910s
adopted Rylands, with fifteen states and the District of Columbia solidly
accepting Rylands, nine more leaning toward Rylands or its rule, five states
wavering, and only three states consistently rejecting it.9 Just after the turn
5. Fletcher v. Rylands, 1 L.R.-Ex. 265, 279-80 (Ex. Ch. 1866); Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-
E. & I. App. 330, 338-39 (H.L. 1868).
6. Infra Section I.B.
7. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1; HORWITZ. supra note 1; SCHWARTZ, supra note 1; WHITE,
supra note 1; see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 134-36 (1995).
8. 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911).
9. See infra Section I.D. The criterion in this Note for defining a state's adoption of Rylands
is the existance of an approving citation relating to its strict liability rule, without accompanying
comments about the fact that states generally disapprove of Rylands, and without a subsequent
case doubting Rylands (in the relevant time period). The standard for rejection is an explicit
statement rejecting Rylands's rule itself or declaring that most American states have not adopted
it. States that adopted a rule similar to Rylands (finding strict liability for an activity because it is
"non-natural" or "artificial") or generally approved of Rylands, despite a case or two rejecting it,
are considered to be "leaning." States that vacillated between accepting and rejecting Rylands for
a significant part of the relevant time period are categorized as wavering.
This Note's criterion for acceptance is slightly stricter than William Prosser's implicit
standard in The Principle of Rylands v. Fletcher, the only other work to assess thoroughly
Rylands's acceptance nationwide. PROSSER, supra note 4. For example, Prosser listed Missouri as
accepting Rylands, based upon French v. Center Creek Powder Manufacturing, 158 S.W. 723
(Mo. Ct. App. 1913). PROSSER, supra note 4, at 153. However, after the Missouri Supreme Court
adopted Rylands in Mathews v. St. Louis & San Francisco Railway, 24 S.W. 591 (Mo. 1893), a
lower court temporarily rejected it in Murphy v. Gillum, 73 Mo. App. 487, 492-93 (Mo. Ct. App.
1898), and the state supreme court expressed some doubt in Gannon v. Laclede Gaslight, 47 S.W.
907, 912 (Mo. 1898) (declining to apply Rylands to electricity and noting that Rylands "has not
met with approval in all American jurisdictions"). Thus, this Note categorizes Missouri as
"wavering" over this period. Two more examples are Colorado and West Virginia, which Prosser
counts as "accepting." PROSSER, supra note 4. Because of other cases in this time period that
were critical of Rylands, this Note categorizes Colorado as "leaning," infra note 70, and West
Virginia as "wavering," infra note 88. One final example is Iowa. Prosser characterized Healey v.
Citizens' Gas & Electric Co., 201 N.W. 118 (Iowa 1924), as adopting Rylands. Because this case
also discussed several other cases questioning or rejecting Rylands, however, this Note considers
Healey as only "leaning" toward Rylands. However, Iowa had adopted Rylands in 1886 in
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of the century, the California Supreme Court declared, more correctly than
not, that "It]he American authorities, with hardly an exception, follow the
doctrine laid down in the courts of England [in Rylands]." 'o In the
following years, some states shifted against Rylands, but an equivalent
number of new states also adopted Rylands." Accordingly, a strong
majority of states has consistently recognized this precedent for strict
liability from about 1890 to the present.
In addition to presenting the new evidence about Rylands's adoption,
this Note also explores the various factors influencing the adoption: broad
social changes, economic patterns, political shifts, and a series of reservoir
accidents and floods. While urbanization, economics, and politics played a
role, this Note concludes that a series of tragic dam failures, particularly the
Johnstown Flood of 1889, was the most direct and substantial cause. By
focusing on particular disasters, this account seeks to challenge the previous
assumptions that either long-term socioeconomic forces or academic and
political elites primarily caused Rylands's adoption in the mid-twentieth
century.
Part I presents an overview of Rylands v. Fletcher and then discusses
the phases of the American response: the initial acceptance; the
Northeastern rejections in the 1870s, which have been the basis for the
erroneous scholarly conclusions; and the overlooked tide of acceptances
across the country, beginning in the late 1880s and increasing in the 1890s.
Part II places this wave of acceptance in its historical context of changing
social forces, although these brief sketches are not the primary emphasis of
this Note. First, during a period of rapid urbanization, a small number
of courts sought to protect residential areas against the risks of
industrialization.12 Second, courts adopted or rejected Rylands partially in
response to business cycles: The phase of rejections in the 1870s loosely
corresponded to the depression of the 1870s, when courts would have been
most eager to subsidize industry, and the subsequent industrial boom in the
1880s and early 1890s corresponded with the wave of acceptances. 3
However, this economic link is undermined by a closer examination of the
Phillips v. Waterhouse, 28 N.W. 539 (Iowa 1886), and thus, for the period studied by this Note,
Iowa qualifies as "accepting."
This Note's criterion for rejection is about the same as Prosser's, but this Note's two middle
categories attempt to offer a clearer and more nuanced perspective. A mere recognition of
nuisance is not enough to qualify as "leaning toward Rylands," but a case that explicitly targets
"artificial" or "non-natural" uses as the cause of the nuisance can fall under the Rylands doctrine,
depending on the court's language. This Note provides a fuller explanation of why particular
states are leaning or wavering. For complete citations and state tallies on Rylands, see infra
Section I.D. For the purposes of this historical work, this Note lists cases chronologically.
10. Kleebauer v. W. Fuse & Explosives Co., 69 P. 246, 247 (Cal. 1903).
11. See infra Section LD for complete citations.
12. See infra Section I.B.
13. Infra Section II.C.
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timing of these cycles and the patterns of rejection and acceptance. The
initial rejections occurred before the onset of depression in the 1870s, states
generally resisted Rylands for most of the 1880s boom, and Rylands
continued to prevail during the depression of the mid-1890s. In terms of
politics, the adoption of Rylands corresponded with the rise of populism
and an emerging legislative consensus to begin regulating industry, most
prominently in the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890.' However, the influence
of populism is also questionable, because Rylands fared better in
Republican states than in the more populist states. Each of these forces
played an underlying role in Rylands's adoption, but this Note demonstrates
that these broader economic, social, and political trends are flawed and
insufficient explanations. As a result, these factors are more accurately
described as background conditions merely setting the stage, rather than as
the direct causes of the adoption.
Finally, and most importantly, Part II suggests the direct cause by
connecting a series of bursting reservoirs and floods in the 1880s and 1890s
to a decisive breakthrough of adoptions. In his study of Rylands in its
English context, A.W. Brian Simpson persuasively argues that Rylands was
the product of British reservoir accidents in 1853 and 1864."5 Similarly
tragic disasters occurred in California and Pennsylvania in the 1880s, with
similar legal results. After a series of powerful floods and a long political
and legal battle over destructive hydraulic gold-mining techniques,
California adopted Rylands in 1886. In 1889, an artificial recreational lake
owned by a club of the wealthy elite (including business titans Andrew
Carnegie and Andrew Mellon) burst through a poorly built dam, destroying
Johnstown, Pennsylvania, and killing 2000 people. The nation's media and
courts focused intently on the Johnstown Flood, and perceived, mostly
inaccurately, that the fault doctrine prevented recovery through the tort
system. Two months after the Flood, one of the most influential law
publications in the country, the American Law Review, focused on the
tragedy and argued that the fault doctrine unjustly prevented recovery in
such cases. The Review concluded that courts should adopt Rylands, rather
than the flawed and abuse-prone fault doctrine. Thereafter, state courts
began adopting Rylands for a wide array of unnatural activities. Whereas
Simpson contended that Rylands's rule was anomalous and applied to only
a narrow set of cases, American state courts applied Rylands expansively
across a wide spectrum of industrial and nonindustrial problems. In these
courts, the bursting reservoir was not treated as legally unique, but as part
of a broader problem of industrial age hazards. 16 Perhaps the most
14. Infra Section il.D.
15. See Simpson, supra note 1.
16. For some conjecture about this difference, see infra text accompanying note 347, which
suggests that American state courts applied Rylands more broadly and more responsively to public
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surprising part of this trend is that three of the states most widely
recognized for their rejection of Rylands-New York, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania-reversed their stance on Rylands in the 1890s, soon after the
Johnstown Flood.
The story of Rylands's acceptance offers a new perspective on the
history of strict liability and illustrates the responsiveness of state courts to
industrial accidents and popular fears, which this Note discusses in Part IV.
While American courts initially subsidized the industrial revolution, 7 the
late nineteenth century's rapid urbanization, incredible economic success,
and political reform set the stage for broad legal changes, but these forces
were insufficient. Ultimately, a series of terrifying experiences with the
revolution's darker side made the industrial age's risks more salient and
triggered a wide imposition of strict liability. These dramatic events,
combined with broad social changes, seem to have tapped into an inchoate
notion of the "cheapest cost avoider,"' 8 though the courts did not yet
articulate this understanding in any explicit way. This account also sheds
light on the errors of the "legal science" scholars of the early twentieth
century, who over-conceptualized doctrine, as well as those of more
contemporary legal historians and constitutional scholars, who have over-
conceptualized historical eras. Finally, federal courts generally ignored
Rylands over this period. 9 This Note offers this discrepancy as an example
of the different dynamics of the two judicial systems, and of the
significance of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins 0 in bringing the federal courts
back into line with state common law.
I. RYLANDS IN THE CENTURY OF FAULT
A. Fletcher v. Rylands: The Case
Rylands is perhaps as renowned for its bizarre series of events as for its
sweeping declaration of strict liability. John Rylands, an extremely
successful entrepreneur,2' needed to provide an additional source of water
for his huge steam-powered textile mill, so he hired a contractor to dig a
large ditch and create a reservoir. In 1860, the reservoir burst through an
abandoned coal-mining shaft, which connected with neighboring active
fears than English courts because many state judges were elected, rather than appointed. Prosser
also comments that English courts restricted the application of Rytands, but his stance is much
more moderate than Simpson's. See PROSSER, supra note 4, at 142.
17. See HoRwrTz, supra note 1, at 85-99; Gregory, supra note 1. For the most persuasive
historical refutation of the subsidization thesis, see Schwartz, supra note 1.
18. Infra text accompanying notes 340-342.
19. Infra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
20. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
21. Simpson, supra note 1, at 239 n. 117.
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coal mines owned by Thomas Fletcher.22 The reservoir water flooded the
interlocking maze of mines, causing Fletcher to abandon his coal mines
permanently.23
Fletcher sued Rylands in the Court of the Exchequer, but this trial court
relied on the common law's limitation of recovery to trespass, negligence,
and nuisance, and ruled that Fletcher's case met none of these causes of
action." Fletcher then appealed to the Exchequer Chamber and won.
Writing for a unanimous court of six justices, Justice Blackburn announced
a broad statement of liability, beyond the established grounds of trespass,
nuisance, or negligence:
[T]he person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and
collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes,
must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie
answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of
its escape.2
Blackburn then qualified this sweeping doctrine of strict liability by
focusing on what is "naturally there," in an apparent defense of traditional
uses of land, such as agriculture and mining.
26
On July 17, 1868, the House of Lords upheld the Exchequer Chamber's
ruling in favor of strict liability and elaborated upon Justice Blackburn's
opinion. Consistent with Justice Blackburn, Lord Cairns emphasized the
difference between natural use and non-natural use. Such a "non-natural
use" must be "likely to do mischief," rather than a use that would be
expected "in the ordinary course of the enjoyment of the land."27
B. The Initial Split in the American Courts
Massachusetts and Minnesota immediately adopted Rylands. In 1868,
just two months after Lord Cairns delivered the final Rylands decision, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court relied upon his ruling in imposing liability
without fault.2 Massachusetts consistently expanded its application of the
22. Fletcher v. Rylands, 159 Eng. Rep. 737, 740 (Ex. 1865).
23. Simpson, supra note 1, at 241-42.
24. Rylands, 159 Eng. Rep. at 744-47. At the time of the accident, the doctrine of respondeat
superior did not make an employer legally responsible for independent contractors. See WILLIAM
L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 70, at 480 (1964). This rule applies today,
although there are many exceptions, including one for "inherently dangerous activities." Id.; see
also JOHN W. WADE ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TORTS 666 (10th ed. 2000).
25. Fletcher v. Rylands, 1 L.R.-Ex. 265,279 (Ex. Ch. 1866).
26. Id. at 280.
27. Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330, 338-39 (H.L. 1868).
28. Ball v. Nye, 99 Mass. 582 (1868).
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Rylands doctrine,29 most notably in a decision by Oliver Wendell Holmes,3°
who otherwise championed the fault doctrine in his immensely influential
writings." Minnesota adopted Rylands in 1872 and continued to apply it
extensively."2
This initially open reception ended in New York in 1873. In the case of
Losee v. Buchanan,33 a steam boiler exploded because of a manufacturer's
defect, without any negligence by the owner. New York's highest court
unanimously held that liability for such damage required proof of
negligence. In its repudiation of Rylands, the court offered a social contract
philosophy that civilization requires the sacrifice of some rights in order to
promote economic and industrial development, which provide for the
"general good."'  Six months later, New Hampshire weighed in against
Rylands in Brown v. Collins.35 Judge Charles Doe contended that strict
liability was a vestige of a primitive time, now inconsistent with industrial
growth, while the negligence rule was a "modem," "rational," "coherent
and logical system," and was compatible with the industrial age. 6 The New
Jersey Supreme Court joined in the condemnation of Rylands in Marshall v.
Welwood,37 declaring that "[t]he common rule, quite institutional in its
character, is that, in order to sustain an action for a tort, the damage
complained of must have come from a wrongful act." 3
Pennsylvania initially approved of Rylands in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Sanderson39 in 1878 and 1880, but it reversed itself in a new appeal of the
same case in 1886.' The Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that Rylands
"has not been generally received in this country," 41 and announced, " [W]e
are unwilling to recognize the arbitrary and absolute rule of responsibility it
declares .... 42 The court expressed its concern that such rules would
threaten the state's coal industry, which was "a great public interest." 43
29. Shipley v. Fifty Assocs., 101 Mass. 251 (1869), affd, 106 Mass. 194 (1870). See infra
Section I.B for other Massachusetts cases.
30. Davis v. Rich, 62 N.E. 375 (Mass. 1902).
31. Holmes famously set forth his support for the fault doctrine in OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (Boston, Little, Brown 1881).
32. Cahill v. Eastman, 18 Minn. 324, 334-37, 344-46 (1872); see also infra Section II.B.
Despite the apparent differences between Minnesota and Massachusetts, this Note suggests in
Section Il.B that these acceptances relate to the impact of urbanization.
33. 51 N.Y. 476 (1873).
34. Id.
35. 53 N.H. 442 (1873).
36. Id. at 449-50; see also Garland v. Towne, 55 N.H. 55 (1874) (rejecting Rylands again).
37. 38 N.J.L. 339 (1876).
38. Id. at 343.
39. 86 Pa. 401 (1878) [hereinafter Sanderson 1], affd, 94 Pa. 302 (1880) [hereinafter
Sanderson II].
40. 6 A. 453 (Pa. 1886) [hereinafter Sanderson III].
41. Id. at460.
42. Id. at 463.
43. Id. at 459.
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C. Rejection by the Scholars
With New York, New Hampshire, and New Jersey rejecting Rylands,
and with Pennsylvania switching to a rejection, torts scholars drew their
final conclusions. Initially, scholars were either receptive or had mixed
views. Oliver Wendell Holmes played a crucial role in establishing the
negligence rule, but that distinction often overshadows his approval of
Rylands." Recognizing this exception to tort law's general "culpability"
requirement, Holmes credited Rylands to "more or less definitely thought-
out views of public policy [as opposed to legal principle].... [Ilt is politic
to make those who go into extra-hazardous employments take the risk on
their own shoulders." 45 In The Common Law in 1881, Holmes noted that
"[s]ome courts have refused to follow Rylands v. Fletcher," citing New
Jersey's Marshall v. Welwood,4 but he continued to support Rylands.47
Judge Holmes applied Rylands in a little-known case in 1902 involving an
icy sidewalk: "When knowledge of the damage done or threatened to the
public is established, the strict rule of Rylands v. Fletcher is not in
question." 48
While Holmes continued to support Rylands, other contemporary torts
scholars repudiated it and reported its rejection.49 The influential "legal
science" scholars of the 1910s, including Francis Bohlen," Ezra Ripley
Thayer,5 and Jeremiah Smith,52 continued to rely almost exclusively on the
Northeastern rejections of the 1870s and ignored the groundswell of
acceptance.53
Scholars continued to assert that American courts rejected Rylands until
1953, when William Prosser published a study demonstrating that the
44. Scholars cite Holmes's major works that were pivotal in establishing the fault regime, for
example, HOLMES, supra note 31. For a more recent edition, see OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE
COMMON LAW (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Little, Brown 1963). For in-depth, insightful
discussions of Holmes and his ideas about Rylands and liability in general, see DAVID
ROSENBERG, HIDDEN HOLMES (1995); and Clare Dalton, Losing History: Tort Liability in the
Nineteenth Century and the Case of Rylands v. Fletcher 29-73 (unpublished manuscript, on file
with The Yale Law Journal), which focuses mainly on the British perspective on Rylands.
45. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L. REV. 652, 653 (1873).
46. 38 N.J.L. 339 (1876).
47. HOLMES, supra note 31, at 88, 116-19, 156-57.
48. Davis v. Rich, 62 N.E. 375, 377 (Mass. 1902) (citation omitted). Holmes also concurred
in Ainsworth v. Lakin, 62 N.E. 746 (Mass. 1902), which endorsed Rylands.
49. THOMAS COOLEY, THE LAW OF TORTS 680 & n.2 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1888)
(rereading Rylands to require reasonable care, making it "a question of negligence"); FRANCIS
WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE 716-17, 723 n.4 (Philadelphia, Kay &
Brother 1874).
50. Francis Bohlen, The Rule in Fletcher v. Rylands (pft. 2), 59 U. PA. L. REv. 373, 388
(1911) (citing Sanderson I1, 6 A. 453 (Pa. 1886), as well).
51. Ezra Thayer, Liability Without Fault, 29 HARV. L. REv. 801,802 (1916).
52. Jeremiah Smith, Tort and Absolute Liability: Suggested Changes in Classification, 30
HARV. L. REV. 409, 413 (1917).
53. See infra Section IV.B for a discussion of legal science scholars and their agenda.
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assumption about Rylands's continuing rejection was "erroneous." 54
Prosser's article focused on its acceptance at that time, and not on the
historical patterns of its acceptance.55 In 1971, Prosser discussed his
understanding of the historical development of this gradual adoption. After
noting Massachusetts's and Minnesota's acceptances, Prosser focused more
on the rejections in New York, New Hampshire, and New Jersey, and the
"condemn[ation] by legal writers," including Thayer and Smith in the
1910s. 56 Prosser explained that Rylands was rejected because of the
country's desire to promote "industrial and commercial development."57
Strict liability could be accepted only after the close of the frontier and the
development of the nation's resources and economy. Prosser never
pinpointed when courts shifted, but he added, "After a long period during
which Rylands v. Fletcher was rejected by the large majority of the
American courts which considered it, the pendulum has swung to
acceptance of the case and its doctrine in the United States." " Emphasizing
a "long period" of rejection, Prosser's storyline found its way into the
major torts casebooks and legal historical works from the 1970s to the
present,59 which generally assert that Rylands was not adopted until the
mid-twentieth century.
54. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 152.
55. The point of Prosser's article was to demonstrate that American courts, whether or not
they adopted Rylands, created a rule of "absolute nuisance." PROSSER, supra note 4, at 190. His
article cited fifteen states adopting Rylands as of 1953; three more that could be included as
adopting Rylands. although these cases were "not so clear"; and twelve states that rejected
Rylands. Id. at 151-54. Prosser cites some adopting cases from the 1880s and 1890s, but they
appear only in footnotes, and they are not placed into any historical context.
56. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 548 (5th ed.
1984) (citing a passage from Prosser's 1971 edition).
57. Id. at 549.
58. Id
59. E.g., MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT LAW
AND ALTERNATIVES 448-49 (5th ed. 1992) ("From the outset, American courts were less than
enthusiastic about recognizing a broad principle of strict liability on the basis of Rylands, that
would apply to cases involving neighboring landowners."); JERRY J. PHILLIPS ET AL., TORT LAW:
CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 660-61 (1991) (mentioning "frequent attacks on the rule in
Rylands v. Fletcher by courts of the United States," and citing a 1982 case recognizing the
national acceptance of Rylands); RICHARD A. POSNER, TORT LAW: CASES AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 506 (1982) ("Losee is typical of a number of cases in which American courts have
'rejected' the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher."); HARRY SHULMAN ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 63-64 n.31 (3d ed. 1976) (arguing that "the reluctance to
impose strict liability" has been "relaxed," and citing cases and articles from the 1930s and
1940s, along with Prosser's 1953 article); WADE ET AL., supra note 24, at 693 ("These decisions
[in New York, New Hampshire, and New Jersey] gave Rylands v. Fletcher a bad name, and it was
rejected in several jurisdictions... In recent years the American trend has been very much in
favor of approval of the case, and a substantial majority now favor the case." (emphasis added));
see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 425-26 (1973) ("But the
case had a mixed reception in America. A few courts eagerly accepted the principle. [Friedman
here mentions only an Ohio case in 1899.] Other courts reacted in utter panic at this alien intruder.
The doctrine was too much, too soon."); MORTON J. HORWrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 124 (1992) ("Most American
courts immediately resisted [Rylands,] this new major barrier to the triumph of the negligence
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Based upon these mistaken assumptions, one accepted theory posits
that the Restatement of Torts in 1938, which approved of strict liability for
"ultrahazardous activity," 6 turned the tide against the courts' opposition to
Rylands.6" This top-down, academia-centered theory suggests that legal
scholars alone were responsible for the shift toward Rylands, which
occurred in the midst of the sweeping political and economic upheaval of
the Great Depression and the New Deal. This Note attempts to refute this
claim, and shows that economics was only a partial factor in the adoption.
D. The Overlooked Acceptance of Rylands
Legal scholars looked no further than the rulings in the four prominent
Northeastern courts of Massachusetts, New York, New Hampshire, and
Pennsylvania. However, Louisiana62 and Georgia63 had already adopted a
rule similar to Rylands, and then a wave of courts in the West, Midwest,
and South accepted Rylands or a similar rule in the mid-i 880s: Wisconsin,'
Michigan," Illinois, 66 Iowa,6 7 Nevada,68  California,69  Colorado,
7° and
principle."); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE LAW IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 124 (1974) ("American
judges were most reluctant to accept the English imposition of absolute liability .... By the turn
of the century, Rylands v. Fletcher was followed in only a handful of American courts .... A
leading tort text headed its discussion: 'Rylands v. Fletcher Not Generally Approved in
America."'); G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 16-19,
109-10 (1980) (emphasizing the rejection of Rylands in describing the "rise of negligence,"
which, according to White, began to yield to strict liability in the 1930s and 1940s); Jon G.
Anderson, Comment, The Rylands v. Fletcher Doctrine in America: Abnormally Dangerous,
Ultrahazardous, or Absolute Nuisance?, 1978 ARIz. ST. L.J. 99, 100 ("More than a hundred years
after the first court adopted it, the Rylands rule has finally come to be accepted by the great
majority of states."). Richard Epstein more accurately describes a shift occurring in the "first half
of the twentieth century," but he refrains from calling that shift an "adoption," and ambiguously
describes its "recent reception" as "more favorable." RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS 134-36 (6th ed. 1995) (emphasis added).
60. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 519 (1938).
61. For an example of scholars offering this theory, see Nolan & Ursin, supra note 2, at 258.
62. Hooper v. Wilkinson, 15 La. Ann. 497,497 (1860). In Hooper, a water drainage and dam
case, the Louisiana Supreme Court interpreted its Civil Code to embody a distinction between
"natural" and "artificial" water use. The court cited the state code's restriction against raising
"any dam, or to make any other work to prevent this running of the water." Id. at 497. After
noting that landowners have a right to "natural" drainage, the court concluded that the law
"recognizes the right of a proprietor to perform artificial drainage, but not so as to pervert the
right of servitude, as originating from the natural situation of the place." Id. Without any question
of fault or nuisance, the court then ruled that the artificial drainage ditches in question must be
closed.
63. Phinizy v. City Council, 47 Ga. 260, 266 (1872). The Georgia Supreme Court ruled in
Phinizy that a landowner is not liable for natural drainage or overflow, but he is liable without
fault for drainage "by artificial means." Id. For a later adoption of Rylands itself, see Holman v.
Athens Empire Laundry Co., 100 S.E. 207,210 (Ga. 1919).
64. Atkinson v. Goodrich Transp. Co., 18 N.W. 764, 775 (Wis. 1884) (citing Rylands as a
valid precedent, but not applying it to make the defendant liable without fault).
65. Boyd v. Conklin, 20 N.W. 595, 598 (Mich. 1884). Contra Scott v. Longwell, 102 N.W.
230, 231 (Mich. 1905) (questioning Rylands's validity). Because of Scott, this Note considers
Michigan to be "leaning."
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Alabama." In the early 1890s, six Eastern courts jumped on the Rylands
bandwagon: Maryland,72 Ohio,73 Vermont,74 South Carolina,75 and even two
66. Chi. & N.W. Ry. v. Hunerberg, 16 111. App. 387, 390-91 (1885); Seacord v. People, 13
N.E. 194,200 (i1. 1887).
67. Phillips v. Waterhouse, 28 N.W. 539, 540 (Iowa 1886).
68. Boynton v. Longley, 6 P. 437, 441 (Nev. 1885). In Boynton v. Longley, the Nevada
Supreme Court held that a landowner was not liable for naturally flowing water.
But this rule... only applies to waters which flow naturally from springs, from storms
of rain or snow, or the natural moisture of the land. Wherever courts have had occasion
to discuss this question, they have generally declared that the servitude of the lower
land cannot be augmented or made more burdensome by the acts or industry of man.
Id. The court then cited Washburn, a legal scholar, explaining that the owner of an upper field
may allow "naturally descend[ing]" water to flow into another's land, but not water from
"artificial trenches, or otherwise ... in unusual quantities." Id. Nowhere in the ruling against the
defendant does the court find the defendant negligent, nor liable for nuisance. Rather, this holding
is strict liability for unnatural water use, which is essentially a limited application of the rule
found in Rylands.
69. Colton v. Onderdonk, 10 P. 395, 397-98 (Cal. 1886).
70. G., B. & L. Ry. v. Eagles, 13 P. 696, 697-98 (Colo. 1887); see also Sylvester v. Jerome,
34 P. 760, 762 (Colo. 1893); Larimer County Ditch Co. v. Zimmerman, 34 P. 1111, 1112 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1893). In Garnet Ditch and Reservoir Co. v. Sampson, 110 P. 79 (Colo. 1910), the
Colorado Supreme Court questioned Rylands. Id. at 80. Nevertheless, Garnet still adhered to the
Rylands rule based upon a Colorado statute imposing strict liability for reservoir breaks, but it also
used expansive language about "dangerous" activities:
The storage of water is a source of profitable investment of capital. The owners know,
however, that water, from its nature, is pressing outward in all directions and
continually striving to break through any artificial barrier by which it may be
restrained. They know that the breaking of the barrier may result in great damage to
many innocent persons; that death and destruction may follow the escape of the stored
water, and the legislature has said to these owners: "If you collect so dangerous an
agency on your own land, you must keep it confined-if it escapes-it is at your peril."
Id. at 83. Colorado's resistance to Rylands continued in North Sterling Irrigation Co. v. Dickman,
149 P. 97, 98 (Colo. 1914) (citing Garnet, supra, for negligence standard), but it returned to the
fold in the 1920s. Beaver Water and Irrigation Co. v. Emerson, 227 P. 547, 547 (Colo. 1924);
Ryan Gulch Reservoir Co. v. Swartz, 234 P. 1059, 1061 (Colo. 1925). Though the Colorado
Supreme Court clearly adopted Rylands in the 1880s and reaffirmed its commitment to Rylands in
the 1920s, this Note categorizes Colorado as "leaning," because Garnet questioned Rylands itself
while adhering to the Rylands rule.
71. City of Eufaula v. Simmons, 6 So. 47, 48 (Ala. 1889); Drake v. Lady Ensley Coal Co., 14
So. 749, 751 (Ala. 1894) (rejecting Sanderson 11I, 6 A. 453 (Pa. 1886)). In City of Eufaula v.
Simmons, the municipality's sewers and ditches had overflowed and damaged the plaintiff's
property. Without mentioning nuisance, the court ruled that if one
in the construction of sewers and digging of ditches ... caused a large quantity of rain
water, which naturally flowed in another direction, to be diverted so as to flow on the
plaintiffs premises in destructive quantities, resulting in the injury of her adjoining
property, the defendant corporation would be liable to her in damages, whether the
work was done negligently or not.
Simmons, 6 So. at 48.
72. Susquehanna Fertilizer Co. v. Malone, 20 A. 900, 901 (Md. 1890); Baltimore Breweries'
Co. v. Ranstead, 28 A. 273, 274 (Md. 1894).
73. Columbus & Hocking Coal & Iron Co. v. Tucker, 26 N.E. 630, 633 (Ohio 1891);
Defiance Water Co. v. Olinger, 44 N.E. 238, 239-40 (Ohio 1896) (not applying Rylands directly,
due to the defendant's averred negligence, but commenting that the Rylands "doctrine would
seem to be in exact accord with justice and sound reason"); Bradford Glycerine Co. v. St. Mary's
Woolen Mfg., 54 N.E. 528, 530-31 (Ohio 1899).
74. Gilson v. Del. & Hudson Canal Co., 26 A. 70, 72 (Vt. 1892).
75. Frost v. Berkeley Phosphate Co., 20 S.E. 280,283 (S.C. 1894).
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of the most prominent rejecting states, New York and New Jersey.
76 Four
Western and Midwestern states also adopted Rylands in the 1890s:
Oregon,77 Missouri," Wyoming,79 and Kansas."0 Also at this time,
Pennsylvania embraced Rylands's rule in the early 1890s,"1 Utah leaned
toward Rylands,82  and Texas wavered. 3 Between 1900 and 1911,
Tennessee," Montana, 5 the District of Columbia, 6 Indiana,1
7 and West
76. For New York and New Jersey, see infra Subsection III.D.4.
77. Esson v. Wattier, 34 P. 756, 757 (Or. 1893); see also Mallett v. Taylor, 152 P. 873, 874
(Or. 1915).
78. Mathews v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 24 S.W. 591, 598 (Mo. 1893); see also French v. Ctr.
Creek Powder Mfg., 158 S.W. 723, 725 (Mo. Ct. App. 1913). Contra Murphy v. Gillum, 73 Mo.
App. 487, 492-93 (Mo. Ct. App. 1898) (noting that other states generally reject Rylands and
reinterpreting Rylands as requiring "due care"); Gannon v. Laclede Gaslight Co., 47 S.W. 907,
912 (Mo. 1898) (declining to apply Rylands to electricity and noting that Rylands "has not met
with approval in all American jurisdictions"). Because Murphy and Gannon resisted Rylands
while Mathews and French supported Rylands more decisively, this Note categorizes Missouri as
"wavering."
79. Clear Creek Land & Ditch Co. v. Kilkenny, 36 P. 819, 820 (Wyo. 1894).
80. Reinhart v. Sutton, 51 P. 221, 222 (Kan. 1897).
81. Robb v. Carnegie Bros., 22 A. 649, 650-51 (Pa. 1891); Lentz v. Carnegie Bros., 23 A.
219, 220 (Pa. 1892); Hauck v. Tide Water Pipe-Line Co., 26 A. 644, 645 (Pa. 1893). For other
cases, see infra Subsection III.D.2.
82. N. Point Consol. Irrigation Co. v. Utah & Salt Lake Co., 52 P. 168, 173 (Utah 1898). The
Utah Supreme Court ruled in favor of a plaintiff whose land was damaged by the defendant's
irrigation waste water:
Undoubtedly a proprietor of higher land is entitled to the benefit of the natural flow
therefrom, onto the lands of another, of surface or other water not brought there by
artificial means. But, when the water is brought onto the higher land by artificial
means, the proprietor is not entitled to such natural flow onto the land of another, to his
injury.
Id. The court did not refer to Rylands and did not generalize from artificial water use to all "non-
natural" mischievous uses, but the ruling never relied upon proof of fault and it closely resembled
Rylands's distinction between natural and artificial.
83. For pro-Rytands decisions, see Texas & Pacific Railway v. O'Mahoney, 50 S.W. 1049,
1052 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899); Texas & Pacific Railway v. O'Mahoney, 60 S.W. 902, 904 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1900); and Texas & Pacific Railway v. Frazer, 182 S.W. 1161, 1161-62 (Tex. Civ. App.
1916). For anti-Rylands decisions, see Gulf Colorado & Santa Fe Railway v. Oakes, 58 S.W. 999,
1000 (Tex. 1900); and Barnes v. Zettlemoyer, 62 S.W. 111, 112 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901). For an
explanation of why this Note categorizes Texas as "wavering" and Indiana as "adopting," see
infra note 87.
84. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co. v. Barnes, 60 S.W. 593, 600-01 (Tenn. 1900);
Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658, 664 (Tenn. 1904).
85. Longtin v. Persell, 76 P. 699, 700 (Mont. 1904).
86. Brennan Constr. Co. v. Cumberland, 29 App. D.C. 554, 560-62 (1907).
87. Niagara Oil Co. v. Ogle, 98 N.E. 60, 62 (Ind. 1912); Niagara Oil Co. v. Jackson, 91 N.E.
825, 826-27 (Ind. Ct. App. 1910). Contra Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. v. Chi., Lake Shore & S.
Bend Ry., 92 N.E. 989, 991-92 (Ind. Ct. App. 1910) (recognizing that American law holds
unnatural users liable only for negligence); Postal Tel. & Cable Co. v. Chi., Lake Shore & S. Bend
Ry., 97 N.E. 20, 21 (Ind. Ct. App. 1912) (same). For a discussion of Klenberg v. Russell, 25 N.E.
596, 596-97 (Ind. 1890), see infra note 305. Because the Indiana Supreme Court resolved this
controversy in 1912, this Note recognizes Indiana as "adopting." One might argue that for the
same reason, Texas ought to be considered "rejecting," because the Texas Supreme Court
rejected Rylands. However, the Indiana Supreme Court ended the controversy in favor of Rylands,
while in Texas, a lower court continued to cite Rylands even after the Texas Supreme Court's
rejection, and it adopted a rule similar to Rylands in the 1910s. See infra notes 331-334.
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Virginia88 adopted Rylands. Over these years, only New Hampshire,89
Washington,9 and Kentucky9 consistently rejected the English precedent.
From the mid-1880s to the early 1910s, fifteen states and the District of
Columbia solidly accepted Rylands,92 nine more were leaning toward
Rylands or its rule,93 five states wavered over this period,94 and only three
states consistently rejected. 95 Most surprisingly, the states most commonly
cited for their rejection of Rylands-New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
and Texas-began adopting Rylands or its rule in this period. In the
following years, some states shifted against Rylands,96 but an equivalent
number of states also adopted Rylands,97 so that a strong majority of the
states has always recognized this precedent for strict liability from the
1890s to the present. However, the federal courts generally ignored Rylands
over this period. From 1890 to 1910, only the Seventh Circuit98 and the
88. Weaver Mercantile Co. v. Thurmond, 70 S.E. 126, 128-29 (W. Va. 1911) (adopting
Rylands and noting its adoption by Minnesota and Massachusetts). Contra Vieth v. Hope Salt &
Coal Co., 41 S.E. 187, 188-90 (W. Va. 1902) (commenting that Rylands is "not the American
law" and requiring proof of fault). Because of these conflicting rulings, this Note categorizes
West Virginia as "wavering," but after Weaver, West Virginia remained solidly pro-Rylands.
89. Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442, 442-47 (1873).
90. See Klepsch v. Donald, 30 P. 991, 993 (Wash. 1892). Washington then left the question
open in 1919, Anderson v. Rucker Bros., 183 P. 70, 72 (Wash. 1919), but, considering the earlier
rejection, this Note considers Washington as continuing to reject Rylands.
91. Triple-State Natural Gas & Oil Co. v. Wellman, 70 S.W. 49, 50 (Ky. 1902); Mangan's
Adm'r v. Louisville Elec. Light Co., 91 S.W. 703, 705 (Ky. 1906); Long v. Louisville &
Nashville Ry., 107 S.W. 203, 205 (Ky. 1908); Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Lakeman,
160 S.W. 723, 724 (Ky. 1913). Contra Winchester Waterworks Co. v Holliday, 45 S.W.2d 9, 11
(Ky. 1931) (holding a dam owner liable without fault for flooding resulting from the dam's safety
design).
92. Massachusetts, Minnesota, Illinois, Iowa, California, Maryland, Ohio, Vermont, Oregon,
South Carolina, Wyoming, Kansas, Tennessee, Montana, the District of Columbia, and Indiana, in
chronological order.
93. Louisiana, Georgia, Wisconsin, Michigan, Nevada, Colorado, Alabama, Pennsylvania
(1890-1916), and Utah, in chronological order.
94. New York (wavering 1890-1908), New Jersey (wavering 1895-1903), Missouri
(wavering 1898-1913), Texas (wavering and leaning, 1899-1936), and West Virginia (temporarily
rejecting 1902-1911, but thereafter solidly accepting). For an explanation of why this Note
categorizes Texas as "wavering" and Indiana as "adopting," see supra note 87.
95. New Hampshire, Washington, and Kentucky, in chronological order.
96. These states were: New Jersey and New York, see infra Subsection I.D.4; North
Dakota, see Langer v. Goode, 131 N.W. 258, 259 (N.D. 1911); Pennsylvania, see Householder v.
Quemahoning Coal Co., 116 A. 40, 41 (Pa. 1922); Oklahoma, see Gulf Pipe Line Co. v. Sims,
32 P.2d 902, 905-06 (Okla. 1934); Rhode Island, see Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 173 A. 627,
629 (R.I. 1934); Texas, see Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 128 Tex. 155, 164-66 (1936); Wyoming,
see Jacoby v. Town of Gillette, 174 P.2d 505, 514 (Wyo. 1947); and Maine, see Reynolds v. W.H.
Hinman Co., 75 A.2d 802, 810-11 (Me. 1950).
97. States adopting Rylands during this period were Idaho, see Burt v. Farmers' Co-operative
Irrigation Co., 30 Idaho 752, 767 (1917); Virginia, see King v. Hartung, 96 S.E. 202, 204 (Va.
1918); Georgia, see Holman v. Athens Empire Laundry Co., 100 S.E. 207, 210 (Ga. 1919);
Nebraska, see Barnum v. Handschiegel, 173 N.W. 593, 594 (Neb. 1919); Connecticut, see Worth
v. Dunn, 118 A. 467, 470 (Conn. 1922); South Dakota, see Midwest Oil Co. v. City of Aberdeen,
10 N.W.2d 701, 702 (S.D. 1943); and Arkansas, see Chapman Chem. Co. v. Taylor, 222 S.W.2d
820, 827 (Ark. 1949).
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federal Circuit Court of California9 recognized Rylands, and the District of
Tennessee rejected it."° In the 1910s and 1920s, the Fourth'' and Sixth
Circuits"0 2 adopted Rylands, the Third Circuit voiced mild approval,0 3 and
the Second Circuit temporarily rejected it."°
The following two Parts offer some historical explanations for this
overlooked groundswell of strict liability by examining social changes,
economic cycles, political shifts, and tragic events. In the final analysis,
these tragic events-destructive floods and reservoir collapses in the 1880s
and 1890s-seem to have had the most demonstrably direct impact on legal
change. This case study also suggests that state courts were more
responsive to changes in society and to public outcry, while federal courts
generally adhered to fault rules regardless of the states' overwhelming
adoption of Rylands.
II. PRECONDITIONS AND PRECIPITANTS
A. Overview
In his classic study of the origins of the English Civil War, Lawrence
Stone separated various causes into three categories: "preconditions" for
long-term trends (mostly social and economic); "precipitants" for shorter-
term trends (mostly political and economic); and "triggers" for particular
events sparking the end result."° The preconditions and precipitants set the
stage for the event, but the trigger causes the event to happen in a specific
manner at a specific time. In the next two Parts, I borrow Stone's
vocabulary to present several different causes of the adoption of Rylands. In
addition to the continuing prestige of English precedents in America,
another precondition was rapid urbanization alongside industrialization.
The first precipitant of business cycles and increasing industrial dominance,
98. Burke v. Anderson, 69 F. 814, 818 (7th Cir. 1895) (adopting Rylands in an explosives
case); see also Goodlander Mill Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 63 F. 400, 402 (7th Cir. 1894)
(recognizing Rylands in an oil shipping case, but limiting its application "to instruments and
articles in their nature calculated to do injury, such as are essentially and in their elements
instruments of danger; to acts that are ordinarily dangerous to life or property").
99. Parrott v. Barney, 18 F. Cas. t236, 1242 (C.C. Cal. 1871).
100. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. v. United Elec. Ry., 42 F. 273, 280-81 (D. Tenn. 1890).
101. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Amicon Fruit Co., 269 F. 559, 562 (4th Cir. 1920) (distinguishing
Jennings v. Davis, 187 F. 703 (4th Cir. 1911)).
102. Memphis Consol. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Letson, 135 F. 969, 973 (6th Cir. 1905); see also
Henderson v. Sullivan, 159 F. 46 (6th Cir. 1908) (applying Rylands in ruling explosives a
nuisance).
103. Jacob Doll & Sons v. Ribetti, 203 F. 593 (3d Cir. 1913).
104. Actiesselskabet Ingrid v. Cent. Ry., 216 F. 72, 77-78 (2d Cir. 1914). The Second Circuit
later approved of Rylands in 1931. Exner v. Sherman Power Constr. Co., 54 F.2d 510, 513-15
(2d Cir. 1931).
105. LAWRENCE STONE, THE CAUSES OF THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 1529-1642, at 3-22
(1972).
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and the second precipitant of populism and political reform further set the
stage for legal change. Finally, disastrous dam failures and massive
flooding triggered the wider adoption of Rylands. This Note briefly
sketches these preconditions and precipitants, and points out the
insufficiencies and weaknesses of these factors. Then this Note emphasizes
the trigger of flooding in California, Pennsylvania, and Texas, mainly
because the evidence suggests that this cause was the most direct, and also
because this trigger offers the most interesting insights into the dynamics of
legal change. In one sense, this Note offers these preconditions and
precipitants as important background conditions that shaped Rylands's
reception, but in another sense, this Note addresses these factors as
counterarguments to the reservoir flooding theory. Accordingly, the
following Sections highlight the importance of these factors, as well as their
weaknesses and inconsistencies in explaining the pattern of adoption.
B. Urbanization
The most significant trends of the post-Civil War period were
urbanization, industrialization, and stunning population growth. From 1870
to 1900, the population almost doubled, and at the same time, the number of
urban areas increased by 260%."0 While Eastern cities grew to the largest
sizes, the Midwest and West witnessed the most rapid growth.
Industrialization powered the urban growth, so that industrial areas and
railroads overlapped with residential areas, until factories began moving out
to the suburbs after 1900.'0° Urban factories produced more than 90% of the
industrial output of this era.' Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the new
American industrial city was its population density, which created health
problems and a greater risk that accidents would harm more people.1°9
Considering these rapidly emerging trends, it is not surprising that courts
began imposing strict liability on "non-natural" industrial activities and
urban hazards.
The first two states to adopt Rylands-Massachusetts in 1868 and
Minnesota in 1871-are prime examples of the urbanization boom, and not
coincidentally, they applied Rylands to distinctly urban problems. From
1830 to 1860, the number of households in Boston quadrupled."' The
leader in Eastern urban growth, Boston was the most rapidly growing city
106. See CARL N. DEGLER, THE AGE OF THE ECONOMIC REVOLUTION 1876-1900, at 50-51,
51 tbl. (1974).
107. BLAKE MCKELVEY, URBANIZATION OF AMERICA 43 (1963).
108. Id. at 45.
109. See DEGLER, supra note 106, at 51-52.
110. See Peter R. Knights, Population Turnover, Persistence, and Residential Mobility in
Boston, 1830-1860, in NINETEENTH-CENTURY CITIES 258, 261 (Stephan Thernstrom & Richard
Sennett eds., 1969).
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outside the American West in the mid-nineteenth century, and was one of
the first cities in America to reach a population of 100,000.1" Minnesota
was home to the "Western" model of urban growth in the mid-nineteenth
century: a more sudden population increase, in connection with the
development of agriculture and transportation. St. Paul served as the most
important railroad hub of the upper Midwest, and then Minneapolis
achieved "regional hegemony" over agricultural production, milling, and
manufacturing." 2
In their application of Rylands, both Massachusetts and Minnesota
focused primarily on urban safety and managing residential life in crowded
spaces. The first American case adopting Rylands, Ball v. Nye,' 3 applied
strict liability to a city resident whose filthy stored water percolated into a
neighbor's well. Thereafter, Massachusetts cited Rylands (or its precedents
based on Rylands) for a wide variety of urban hazards applied in urban
contexts: ice sliding off a hazardously steep roof;"4 a public reservoir
flooding a barn;" 5 a collapsing wall;" 6 a collapsing chimney;" 7 a slab of
zinc falling from a roof;" 8 and, in a ruling by Oliver Wendell Holmes, a
leaking pipe creating an icy sidewalk." 9 Minnesota shared the same
concerns, imposing strict liability in urban contexts for ice and snow sliding
off a steep roof in Minneapolis; 2 ' escaping petroleum in Minneapolis;' 2' a
bursting reservoir in another city; 22 and a collapsing awning in
Minneapolis. 123 These cases form the core of the Rylands precedents in
Massachusetts and Minnesota, which courts across the country began to cite
and apply broadly.
However, the problems with urbanization did not persuade many other
courts to adopt strict liability. In the Rylands revival of the 1880s and
1890s, courts in Iowa, 124 California,"2s Maryland, 26 South Carolina,'27 and
111. McKELVEY, supra note 107, at 3-4 (1963).
112. Id. at 25, 35, 37.
113. 99 Mass. 582 (1868).
114. Shipley v. Fifty Assocs., 101 Mass. 251 (1869), afjd, 106 Mass. 194 (1870).
115. Wilson v. New Bedford, 108 Mass. 261, 266 (1871).
116. Gorhamv. Gross, 125 Mass. 232, 238, 239 (1878).
117. Gray v. Boston Gas Light Co., 114 Mass. 149 (1873) (citing Shipley, 101 Mass. 251).
118. Khron v. Brock, 1I N.E. 748 (1887) (citing Gray, 114 Mass. 149).
119. Davis v. Rich, 62 N.E. 375, 377 (Mass. 1902). Holmes was in the majority in Judge
Knowlton's opinion in Ainsworth v. Lakin, 62 N.E. 746 (Mass. 1902), which also endorsed
Rylands.
120. Hannem v. Pence, 41 N.W. 657 (Minn. 1889).
121. Berger v. Minneapolis Gaslight Co., 62 N.W. 336 (Minn. 1895); see also Gould v.
Winona Gas Co., 111 N.W. 254 (Minn. 1907) (imposing strict liability for escaping petroleum).
122. Wiltse v. City of Red Wing, 109 N.W. 114 (Minn. 1906).
123. Waller v. Ross, 110 N.W. 252 (Minn. 1907).
124. Phillips v. Waterhouse, 28 N.W. 539 (Iowa 1886).
125. Colton v. Onderdonk, 10 P. 395 (Cal. 1886).
126. Susquehanna Fertilizer Co. v. Malone, 20 A. 900 (Md. 1890); Baltimore Breweries' Co.
v. Ranstead, 28 A. 273 (Md. 1894).
127. Frost v. Berkeley Phosphate Co., 20 S.E. 280 (S.C. 1894).
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New Jersey'28 applied Rylands in urban contexts, but in this phase the urban
focus seems to have been only a secondary concern. Furthermore, New
York's and New Jersey's consistent rejection of Rylands from the mid-
1870s until the early 1890s and the general dormancy of Rylands in the
1870s and 1880s suggest that the urbanization boom was an insufficient
background condition for nationwide adoption.
C. Business Cycles and Industrial Dominance
Economic trends correspond with the general patterns of Rylands's
treatment. The Panic of 1873 and the resulting depression correspond
loosely to the phase of rejections of Rylands in the 1870s. Then, as the
depression lifted and American industry achieved global dominance, courts
embraced Rylands. At first glance, business cycles appear to be decisive,
but a closer examination reveals some problems with this link.
Massachusetts and Minnesota adopted Rylands in a time of post-Civil
War economic success. In 1872, a Massachusetts commission announced
that there had been "amazing development" of manufacturing production
since the end of the war. The entire Midwest experienced similar success.'29
However, despite widespread industrial success, only Massachusetts and
Minnesota were willing to adopt Rylands, which suggests that economics
played at most a marginal role at this stage.
In January 1873, New York rallied to the defense of industry and
rejected Rylands,13 and New Hampshire followed suit in June 1873."'
While there were signs of economic problems in 1872 and early 1873,112 the
Panic struck in the fall of 1873, months after these rejections. The most
likely explanation for New York's resistance to Rylands is that it already
had a fairly strong body of its own heightened liability precedents for
certain hazardous activities, which were more narrowly and carefully
tailored than Rylands's broader pronouncements.1 33 Once New York had
128. Grey v. Mayor of Paterson, 42 A. 749 (N.J. Ch. 1899).
129. VICTOR S. CLARK, HISTORY OF MANUFACTURES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1860-1914, at
145-48 (1928).
130. Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476 (1873).
131. Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442 (1873).
132. Soon after Massachusetts and Minnesota adopted Rylands, signs of economic problems
appeared. First, the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 to 1871 weakened the world's financial
structure, and Europeans began selling off American securities. Then, huge fires in Chicago in
1871 and in Boston in 1872 crippled the poorly regulated insurance industry, and in May 1873,
European creditors again scrambled to unload their American holdings. Farm crop failures, which
had been increasing through the early 1870s, led to the closing of the nationally significant New
York Warehouse and Security Company in 1873. WILLIAM APPLEMAN WILLIAMS, THE ROOTS
OF THE MODERN AMERICAN EMPIRE 176 (1969). That autumn, these events triggered the "Panic
of 1873" and a worldwide depression that lasted until 1879.
133. See Hay v. Cohoes Co., 2 N.Y. 159 (1849) (holding that plaintiffs did not have to prove
fault in a case of rock blasting in canal construction); Pixley v. Clark, 35 N.Y. 520 (1866)
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already adopted precedents applying to specific hazards, Rylands, with its
ambiguous wording and potentially sweeping applicability, probably
seemed like an unnecessary and hazardous risk itself. Thus, New York's
rejection of Rylands was not a categorical rejection of strict liability, but
rather a selective and cautious approach to strict liability.
Even though the Panic itself was not the cause of the rejections, the
cases of New York and New Hampshire suggest that economics was still
very influential, and that the importance of growth outweighed the desire to
protect urban populations from industry and other risks. The language of
the New York case rejecting Rylands, Losee v. Buchanan, reveals an
underlying anxiety about economic success and expresses a belief that
individuals must sacrifice their rights and their safety in favor of the
common good of economic growth:
By becoming a member of civilized society, I am compelled to give
up many of my natural rights, but I receive more than a
compensation from the surrender by every other man of the same
rights, and the security, advantage and protection which the laws
give me .... We must have factories, machinery, dams, canals and
railroads. They are demanded by the manifold wants of mankind,
and lay at the basis of all our civilization .... I am not responsible
for any damage they accidentally and unavoidably do my neighbor.
He receives his compensation for such damage by the general good,
in which he shares, and the right which he has to place the same
things upon his lands.'34
It is difficult to establish if these courts were responding to the initial
economic problems of 1872 and early 1873, which casts some doubt on the
role of business cycles. However, it is striking that throughout the national
depression of the 1870s, courts either rejected Rylands135 or completely
ignored it. During the depression, Pennsylvania was the only exception to
this trend. 3 6 Therefore, even if the depression of the 1870s did not cause
the initial rejections, it probably played a role in preventing other adoptions.
The 1880s ushered in a new wave of industrial success. By the end of
the decade, the American economy was the most powerful in the world, and
(holding that interference with the natural flow of a stream is an actionable offense, even without
proof of fault). New York continued to expand on these precedents, even after rejecting Rylands
in 1873. See St. Peter v. Denison, 58 N.Y. 416 (1874) (rock blasting); Jutte v. Hughes, 67 N.Y.
267 (1876) (flow of sewage water); Noonan v. City of Albany, 79 N.Y. 470 (1880) (flow of
drainage water); Heeg v. Licht, 80 N.Y. 579 (1880) (explosives). There were dissenters in New
York who cited Rylands. See McCafferty v. Spuyten Duyvil & Port Morris R.R., 61 N.Y. 178
(1874).
134. Id. at 484-85.
135. See, e.g., Marshall v. Welwood, 38 N.J.L. 339 (1876).
136. Sanderson 1, 86 Pa. 401 (1878).
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it continued to expand at an incredible pace.'37 Contrary to the common
perception, this industrial and manufacturing success was not limited to the
Northeast and Midwest. As soon as the depression lifted, the South rapidly
transformed its economy, shifting from agriculture to textile manufacturing
and extensive railroad construction. 38 In the first years of this economic
expansion, state courts were apparently still cautious and avoided the
Rylands controversy. However, once the recovery had lasted several years,
more and more state courts adopted Rylands: Michigan,'39 Illinois,"
Iowa,'4' California, 142 and Colorado. 143 In addition, Nevada and Alabama
adopted rules similar to Rylands,'" and Wisconsin recognized its validity. 45
Whereas Massachusetts and Minnesota had focused mainly on common
urban and distinctly nonindustrial hazards (like snow falling off roofs), 46
these other courts began applying strict liability to big industry, mining, and
railways.147
In 1886, in the midst of strong growth, Pennsylvania aggressively
attacked and rejected Rylands.45 However, after 1890, Pennsylvania
applied strict liability to numerous major industries, including coal mining,
iron production, 49 and oil refining.' Beginning in 1891, Ohio adopted
137. See Gavin Wright, The Origins of American Industrial Success, 1879-1940, in
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 455, 457 chart I (Robert Whaples &
Dianne C. Betts eds., 1995). Income per worker declined sharply in the manufacturing and mining
industries through the 1870s, but then rose even more sharply in those industries afterward,
attaining unprecedented heights in the 1890s. See LANCE E. DAVIS ET AL., AMERICAN ECONOMIC
GROWTH 53 tbl.2.17 (1972). While value added by manufacturing increased just 41% in the
1870s, it increased 210% in the 1880s. Over the course of the decade, aggregate energy
consumption and steel production skyrocketed fivefold. ROBERT HIGGS, THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY, 1865-1914, at 47 (1971). From 1880 to 1900, coal mining and pig
iron production quadrupled, gold and silver production doubled, copper production increased
tenfold, and oil production increased by 240%. See Louis M. HACKER & BENJAMIN B.
KENDRICK, THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1865, at 189 (1946). By 1892, unemployment had
dwindled to a miniscule 3.0%. WILLIAMS, supra note 132, at 358.
138. JACQUELYN DOWD HALL ET AL., LIKE A FAMILY: THE MAKING OF A SOUTHERN
COTTON MILL WORLD 24, 26-27 (1987).
139. Boyd v. Conklin, 20 N.W. 595, 598 (Mich. 1884).
140. Chi. & N.W. Ry. v. Hunerberg, 16 IUl. App. 387, 390-91 (1885); Seacord v. People,
13 N.E. 194, 200 (Ill. 1887).
141. Phillips v. Waterhouse, 28 N.W. 539,540 (Iowa 1886).
142. Colton v. Onderdonk, 10 P. 395, 397-98 (Cal. 1886)
143. G., B. & L. Ry. v. Eagles, 13 P. 696, 697-98 (Colo. 1886).
144. Boynton v. Longley, 6 P. 437, 439 (Nev. 1885); City of Eufaula v. Simmons, 6 So. 47,
48 (Ala. 1889).
145. Atkinson v. Goodrich Transp. Co., 18 N.W. 764, 775 (Wisc. 1884) (citing Rylands as a
valid precedent, but not applying it to make the defendant liable without fault).
146. See supra notes 113-120 and accompanying text. After 1890, Minnesota also began
applying Rylands to industrial hazards. Berger v. Minneapolis Gaslight Co., 62 N.W. 336 (Minn.
1895); Gould v. Winona Gas Co., 111 N.W. 254, 100 Mnn. 258 (1907).
147. See Chi. & N.W. Ry. v. Hunerberg, 16 111. App. 387, 390-91 (1885).
148. Sanderson 111, 6 A. 453, 460-65 (Pa. 1886).
149. See Sullivan v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 57 A. 1065 (Pa. 1904).
150. Gavigan v. At. Ref. Co., 40 A. 834 (Pa. 1898); Green v. Sun Co., 32 Pa. Super. 521
(1907); Vautier v. At. Ref. Co., 79 A. 814 (Pa. 1911).
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Rylands's rule in cases of gas explosions,' bursting water tanks," 2 and
exploding nitroglycerine. 53 Ohio also adopted Rylands in a case of flooding
caused by a coal company. 54 Stating its position in extremely clear
language, the Ohio court declared that mining was unnatural and
"destructive." ' 55 Maryland, 5 6 South Carolina,'57 and indeed, even New
York5 8 and New Jersey5 9 employed Rylands in imposing strict liability
upon industry, mining, gas companies, and railway companies in the 1890s.
This industrial boom seems to have influenced Rylands's revival.
However, the roaring 1880s witnessed only a handful of adoptions, while
most of the adoptions occurred in the 1890s, even during the depression
from 1893 to 1897, which was about as severe as the one in the 1870s. The
railroad industry crumbled, unemployment exploded to 18.4% in 1894, and
the economy plummeted an astounding 18% between 1892 and 1894.161
Perhaps the most intriguing and puzzling aspect of this trend is that, in
contrast to the 1870s depression, most of these states continued applying
Rylands, new states began endorsing Rylands, and rejections were
extremely rare during the 1890s depression. If sustained economic growth
led to a series of adoptions, then why did courts continue to adhere to
Rylands in a second period of severe economic crisis? This inconsistency
demonstrates that business cycles, like urbanization, were merely an
insufficient background condition.
One response might be that the growth from 1879 to 1893 created an
unshakeable sense of security, but this explanation is highly unlikely. The
chain of growth and collapse, growth and collapse would hardly instill
confidence in economic stability.' 6' Two other explanations seem more
plausible. First, the Johnstown Flood, discussed in Part III, seems to have
crystallized a new perspective on "unnatural" hazards and liability.
Second, whereas the Panic of 1873 occurred at a time of political stasis and
produced no discernable political movement, the Panic of 1893 struck after
151. Ohio Gas-Fuel Co. v. Andrews, 35 N.E. 1059 (Ohio 1893).
152. Defiance Water Co. v. Olinger, 44 N.E. 238, 240 (Ohio 1896).
153. Bradford Glycerine Co. v. St. Mary's Woolen Mfg., 54 N.E. 528 (Ohio 1899).
154. Columbus & H. Coal & Iron Co. v. Tucker, 26 N.E. 630, 633 (Ohio 1891).
155. Id. at 632.
156. Susquehanna Fertilizer Co. v. Malone, 20 A. 900 (Md. 1890); Baltimore Breweries' Co.
v. Ranstead, 28 A. 273 (Md. 1894).
157. Frost v. Berkeley Phosphate Co., 20 S.E. 280 (S.C. 1894).
158. Deigleman v. New York, L. & W. Ry. Co., 12 N.Y.S. 83 (Sup. Ct. 1890); Schmeer v.
Gaslight Co., 42 N.E. 202 (N.Y. 1895); Duerr v. Consolidated Gas Co., 83 N.Y.S. 714 (App. Div.
1903).
159. Beach v. Sterling Iron & Zinc Co, 33 A. 286 (N.J. Ch. 1895).
160. 2 BERNARD BAILYN ET AL., THE GREAT REPUBLIC 596 (2d ed. 1981).
161. By 1899, courts were heralding the "general prosperity," Harding v. Harding, 54 N.E.
587, 601 (I11. 1899), and "these piping times of prosperity," Spencer v. Sandusky, 33 S.E. 221,
222 (W. Va. 1899). While recovery might have solidified the courts' commitment to Rylands, this
roller coaster of business cycles might have been expected to cause a rejection of Rylands,
especially because sharp growth is also destabilizing.
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a reform agenda had emerged, and it produced a strong Populist
mobilization. 62 The next Section explores this political factor, with mixed
conclusions.
D. Reform, Regulation, and Populism
A second precipitant was the rise of industrial reform and regulation
in national politics, in the form of Populism, labor activism, and
Congressional regulation. These political developments of the 1880s and
1890s seem to have influenced judicial attitudes toward industry, or at least
reflected general beliefs about corporate accountability that also influenced
the courts.
The labor movement gained momentum in the mid- 1880s, and
continued gaining power for the next thirty years, despite several major
setbacks throughout these years.'63 Membership in the Knights of Labor
peaked in 1886, and after their sudden demise, the American Federation of
Labor (AFL) and other specialized trade unions continued the cause. The
AFL grew steadily through the 1890s, and received a tremendous boost in
membership after 1899." The late 1880s and 1890s were marked by labor
unrest and a popular challenge to laissez-faire economics.
Also at this time, a national movement in favor of regulating railroads
and trusts emerged. In response to the railroad companies' "arrogant,
brutal, and dishonest" abuse of power, Westerners, Southerners, and
Midwesterners aligned to push for regulation in the 1870s and 1880s.'65
After years of legislative maneuvering, Congress passed the Interstate
Commerce Act with bipartisan support in 1887. The Interstate Commerce
Commission was a symbol of increasing regulatory power, but it was also
largely ineffectual.' 66 An even greater symbol of this political challenge was
the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890. Anxieties about rising industry with
concentrated power had coalesced into a "desire for community self-
determination," and an "overwhelming majority" of American leaders
committed themselves to anti-monopoly policies.'67 The Sherman Antitrust
Act passed almost unanimously in 1890. These two congressional acts
resulted from a broad-based popular movement demanding greater control
over corporations and greater protection of consumers. This tide manifested
itself in a series of pro-Rylands cases against railroads in Illinois,'68
162. See HACKER & KENDRICK, supra note 137, at 88-89.
163. See generally DAVID MONTGOMERY, THE FALL OF THE HouSE OF LABOR (1987);
ELiZABETH SANDERS, THE ROOTS OF REFORM (1999).
164. SANDERS, supra note 163, at 39 tbl.3.1.
165. HACKER & KENDRICK, supra note 137, at 263.
166. Id. at 274.
167. ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER 52 (1967).
168. Chi. & N.W. Ry. v. Hunerberg, 16 Ill. App. 387 (1887).
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Colorado, 169 Missouri, 7 ° and Texas, 7' and in cases against railroads and oil
companies in New York, 72 in addition to the other industrial Rylands cases
discussed in this Note. However, both the Interstate Commerce Act and the
Sherman Antitrust Act also demonstrate the resistance of the judiciary to
regulation, because the courts stripped the regulatory powers of both laws
and rendered Congress's actions mostly irrelevant. This judicial resistance
suggests that American courts may have fought against populist political
impulses, so that populism might have produced a pro-business judicial
reaction as much as it produced antitrust legislation. On the other hand, this
judicial challenge to regulation highlights the resistance of federal courts to
popular movements, which is consistent with the federal resistance to
Rylands, and which contrasts with the state courts' acceptance of Rylands.
Finally, the emergence of the Populists defined the politics of the
1890s. Reformist writers such as Henry George, 173 Henry Demarrest
Lloyd, 174 and Edward Bellamy' 5 advanced the Populist agenda in the
1880s, and a coalition of Westerners, Southerners, and Northern labor
emerged by the mid-1890s.'76 With agriculture in long-term decline and the
economy in shambles, the Populist Party and its leader, William Jennings
Bryan, aligned with the Democratic Party, and together they mounted a
bold reformist challenge to the Republicans in 1896. Despite their failure in
national elections, the Populists successfully broke through the political
stasis and kept reform in the national spotlight, undoubtedly influencing
state politics and state courts. These political trends may not have been a
primary reason for the adherence to Rylands, but they shaped the agenda
and reflected broader attitudes toward laissez-faire capitalism.
Just as Rylands defied the depression years of the 1890s, it also
survived in the most pro-business, anti-populist states. Republican William
McKinley won twenty-four states in 1896, predominantly in the Northeast,
the Great Lakes region, and the Pacific. Fourteen of those states, including
the Republican strongholds of New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania,
177
continued to adhere to Rylands after 1896, and also after McKinley's even
more decisive election over Bryan in their 1900 rematch. Of these
Republican states, only New Hampshire and Indiana continued to reject
169. G., B. & L. Ry. v. Eagles, 13 P. 696 (Colo. 1886).
170. Mathews v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 24 S.W. 591 (Mo. 1893).
171. See infra Section II.E.
172. See infra Subsection III.D.4.
173. HENRY GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY (n.p., Robert Schalkenbach Found. 1879).
174. HENRY DEMARREST LLOYD, WEALTH AGAINST COMMONWEALTH (New York, Harper
& Bros. 1894).
175. EDWARD BELLAMY, LOOKING BACKWARD (Penguin 1960) (1888).
176. See generally SANDERS, supra note 163.
177. In addition to New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, the other states were
Massachusetts, Vermont, Maryland, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa,
Oregon, and California. See supra Section I.D for cases.
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Rylands, followed by West Virginia and Kentucky in 1902.78 Even in this
political climate, which championed laissez-faire economics and gave rise
to the Lochner era, Rylands still held onto a fourteen-to-four majority of
Republican states.'79 This odd political marriage suggests that although
national party politics may have influenced the courts somewhat, populism
was not the major explanation for Rylands's nationwide adoption. Despite a
state's general sympathy for business interests, a set of traumatic events-
massive dam failures and flooding--could crystallize public opinion on
certain issues.
III. THE TRIGGERS: DAM COLLAPSES AND TRAGIC FLOODS
A. Simpson's Explanation of Rylands: The Context of Dam Failures
A.W. Brian Simpson persuasively argues that the underlying cause of
the English courts' "anomalous"'8 0 strict liability rulings in Rylands was a
pair of bursting reservoirs elsewhere in England, which had far more tragic
results than Fletcher's flooded coal mines. Simpson begins by examining a
dam collapse in Yorkshire in 1852 that killed seventy-eight people.' 1 In
1853, Parliament responded with legislation rebuilding the dam with new
safety precautions, requiring annual inspections and reports by an appointed
engineer, and empowering local justices of the peace to lower the water
level in case of danger. 8 ' Then, in 1864, during the litigation of Rylands, a
dyke owned by the Sheffield Waterworks Company collapsed in the middle
of the night, killing at least 238 people, destroying several villages, and
creating alarm about many other dams around the country.'83 In 1866, the
Committee of the Commons proposed a bill to impose strict liability for
bursting reservoirs and safety precautions for all reservoirs, but the bill
178. Vieth v. Hope Salt & Coal Co., 41 S.E. 187, 188-90 (W. Va. 1902) (commenting that
Rylands is "not the American law" and requiring proof of fault); Triple-State Natural Gas & Oil
Co. v. Wellman, 70 S.W. 49, 50 (Ky. 1902) (commenting that Rylands "is generally disapproved
in this country"). The Republican states that were silent on Rylands in this period were Maine,
Rhode Island, Connecticut, Delaware, North Dakota, and South Dakota.
179. The presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, beginning in 1901, marked a change to
progressivism and a departure from McKinley's more laissez-faire approach. One might suggest
that the adoption of Rylands ties into the progressive movement, but Rylands prevailed in the late
1880s and early 1890s. Progressivism was certainly developing at this time, but it had not yet
emerged as a more coherent political force. Furthermore, the elections of 1896 and 1900 indicate
the strength of nonprogressive pro-business attitudes among the electorate, particularly in the
states that had adopted Rylands.
180. Simpson, supra note 1, at 214.
181. Id. at 219-21. The flood put about 7000 people out of work, and "destroyed four mills,
ten dye houses, ten drying stoves, twenty seven cottages, seven tradesman's houses, and seven
shops." Id.
182. See Act of 1853, 16 & 17 Vict., c. 138, cl. 64, 65 (cited in Simpson, supra note 1, at 225
& n.55.
183. Simpson, supra note 1, at 225-26.
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failed in 1867. However, in 1864, Parliament did pass an act assigning three
commissioners to assess all claims against the Sheffield Waterworks
Company for the disaster, with the House of Lords insisting on an
amendment "to make it clear that in no case need negligence be proved.'
' 4
Simpson then traces the Rylands litigation and demonstrates how these
disasters and legislative responses, though never mentioned by any of the
key actors, shaped the final ruling. 5
Similarly, this Note demonstrates that American courts adopted
Rylands in the context of bursting reservoirs and other floods. However,
this Note departs from Simpson's conclusion that Rylands was an "isolated
incident in the legal history of the period," 186 and questions his "new
working hypothesis" that "the case was about bursting reservoirs... [and]
their unique features," and not about other hazards."i 7 These observations
about Rylands's sharply limited application and isolated rule may
be slightly overstated, but as William Prosser confirms in a more
moderate stance, English courts confined Rylands's application to
the "extraordinary," "exceptional," and "abnormal," and to limited
contexts. 8 However, American courts applied Rylands not only to bursting
reservoirs, but to a wider spectrum of "non-natural" and often relatively
ordinary industrial enterprises, after a series of terrifying events in
California and Pennsylvania.
B. Califomia
California's adoption of Rylands in 1886 arose in the context of
industrial destruction and flooding resulting from dangerous mining
techniques, dam failures, and a series of severe natural floods in the 1880s.
California's gold rush brought with it a culture of environmental
exploitation. In the mid-1850s, gold mining enterprises began using
hydraulic methods, spraying highly pressurized water to clear
mountainsides. This technique, which reached its peak in 1880, wreaked
extraordinary damage with "rivers of mud" and detritus and badly polluted
waterways. 8 9 Hydraulic mining swept away emergency levees around
184. Id. at 234.
185. Id. at 243-51.
186. Id. at 209. For other interpretations, see ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL
HISTORY 105-10 (1923); Francis Bohlen, The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher (pts. I & 2), supra note
50, at 298, 318-21, 373, 386; and compare Clarence Morris, Hazardous Enterprises and Risk
Bearing Capacity, 61 YALE L.J. 1172 (1952). For a rejection of Bohlen's interpretation, see
Robert Thomas Molloy, Fletcher v. Rylands: A Reexamination of Juristic Origins, 9 U. CHI L.
REv. 266 (1941).
187. Simpson, supra note 1, at 216.
188. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 142.
189. NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., THE GREAT THIRST: CALIFORNIANS AND WATER, 1770s-
1990s, at 76 (1992).
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Sacramento and other towns and severely exacerbated the area's flooding.
In order to produce massive amounts of pressurized water, gold mining
companies built many large reservoirs (containing a total of 7,000,000
cubic feet of water) and 6000 miles of water ditches.190
After a series of failed legal battles over this damage, 9' California
farmers sought a modest legislative solution: the construction of dams to
block the flow of mining debris. However, in the early 1880s, these dams
created far greater problems and threatened to collapse.'92 Just as the
legislature was debating this situation in 1881, a "monster flood, one of the
greatest in the history of the Sacramento Valley," devastated the region and
revealed that the protective levees were a complete failure.'93 In 1883, the
large English Dam in Sierra County, California, measuring 331 feet in
length and 100 feet in height, collapsed under the pressures of high waters
and "rapidly crumpled to its foundations." '94 In the farmers' suit against the
hydraulic miners in 1884, the federal Circuit Court of California noted that
the English Dam collapse was "a striking illustration of what is liable
hereafter to occur.""'9 The court, in granting an injunction, found that
hydraulic mining was "an alarming and ever-growing menace, a constantly
augmenting nuisance, threatening further injuries to the property of
complainant, as well as the lives and property of numerous other similarly
situated citizens." '96 Coinciding with the hydraulic mining controversy,
residents of the Sacramento Valley and Los Angeles began building a series
of dams in the 1870s and 1880s, some of which flooded land or
collapsed. 7
Severe floods struck California regularly, about once every ten years
throughout the nineteenth century. 98 For twenty years after the great flood
of 1861, the state was spared, but then the flood waters returned with a
vengeance throughout the 1880s. The flood of 1881 devastated Northern
California and led to the prohibition against hydraulic mining. Then
Southern California endured two incredible floods in the middle of the
decade. The flood of 1884 "caused considerable damage to the lower
portions" of Los Angeles, sweeping away about fifty houses, killing one
190. Id. at 76; ROBERT L. KELLEY, GOLD VS. GRAIN: THE HYDRAULIC MINING
CONTROVERSY IN CALIFORNIA'S SACRAMENTO VALLEY 21-56 (1959).
191. E.g., Keyes v. Little York Gold Washing & Water Co., 53 Cal. 724 (1879); KELLEY,
supra note 190, at 117.
192. ROBERT KELLEY, BATTLING THE INLAND SEA: AMERICAN POLITICAL CULTURE,
PUBLIC POLICY, AND THE SACRAMENTO VALLEY 1850-1986, at 211-17 (1989).
193. Id. at217.
194. Notable Dam Failures of the Past, 100 ENGINEERING NEWS-REC. 472, 472 (1928).
195. Woodruff v. North Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co., 18 F. 753, 797 (C.C. Cal. 1884).
196. Id.
197. Moulton v. Parks, 6 P. 613, 616-17 (Cal. 1883); HUNDLEY, supra note 189, at 121-48;
KELLEY, supra note 192, at 139-54.
198. 1 J.M. GUINN, A HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA 375-77 (1907).
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person, and increasing the size of the Santa Clara River so that "for some
time [it] rivaled the Mississippi River during a spring rise." "9 In February
1886, a similarly severe flood washed away more homes and drowned two
people.2"u Just one month later, the California Supreme Court adopted
Rylands in Colton v. Onderdonk.20 '
Severe floods inundated California again in 1889 to 1890 and in 1891,
drowning a family of three.2 °2 In the midst of these floods, the court
reaffirmed its commitment to the rule in Rylands. In Parker v. Larsen,
°3 the
court held that the defendant's irrigation water "was not a natural
stream.. . but was brought upon the land by artificial means. And the rule
is general that, where one brings a foreign substance on his land, he must
take care of it and not permit it to injure his neighbor."2 The opinion cited
no cases, but one can assume that this rule came directly from Rylands.
Thereafter, California remained committed to its doctrine."5 Around the
same time, Michigan adopted Rylands with similar concerns about water
use and reservoir floods,26 and two other Western states, Nevada
7 and
Colorado," 8 adopted rules similar to Rylands.
C. The Johnstown Flood and Its Impact
The South Fork Dam, resting directly above Johnstown, Pennsylvania,
had contained one of the largest reservoirs in the country,0 9 with
20,000,000 tons of water across 450 acres.210 In 1879, the South Fork
Fishing and Hunting Club purchased the dam and the reservoir basin for use
as a recreational lake. Andrew Carnegie and Henry Clay Frick, two titans of
199. Id. at 377.
200. Id.
201. 10 P. 395 (Cal. 1886) (filed Mar. 26, 1886). The California Supreme Court had leaned
toward accepting Rylands in two coal mining cases in 1875 and in 1881, when plaintiffs' counsel
relied heavily upon Rylands, and the court held for the plaintiffs. Robinson v. Black Diamond
Coal Co., 50 Cal. 460 (1875); Robinson v. Black Diamond Coal Co., 57 Cal. 412 (1881). Neither
opinion mentioned Rylands, but the 1875 opinion reasoned that defendant was liable because the
damage "was not the result of mere natural causes." Robinson, 50 Cal. at 461.
202. 1 GUINN, supra note 198, at 377.
203. 24 P. 989 (Cal. 1890).
204. Id. at 989.
205. E.g., Kleebauer v. W. Fuse & Explosives Co., 69 P. 246, 247 (Cal. 1902); Sutliff v.
Sweetwater Water Co., 186 P. 766, 767 (Cal. 1920); Kall v. Carruthers, 211 P. 43 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1922).
206. Boyd v. Conklin, 20 N.W. 595 (Mich. 1884).
207. Boynton v. Longley, 6 P. 437, 441 (Nev. 1885).
208. Sylvester v. Jerome, 34 P. 760, 762 (Colo. 1893) (citing section 2272 of Mills'
Annotated Statutes of Colorado as the basis for strict liability for damage caused by reservoirs);
Larimer County Ditch Co. v. Zimmerman, 34 P. 1111, 1112 (Colo. Ct. App. 1893) (citing the
same statute).
209. DISASTER, DISASTER, DISASTER: CATASTROPHES WHICH CHANGED LAWS 17 (Dougles
Newton ed., 1961) [hereinafler DISASTER].
210. DAVID G. MCCULLOUGH, THE JOHNSTOWN FLOOD 41 (1968).
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American industry, were among the founders of the club in 1879, which
was soon tagged as the "Bosses Club.""' Many other Pittsburgh capitalists,
including Andrew Mellon and three Pittsburgh bank directors,1 2 joined the
club not long after it was established.
In the definitive work on the Johnstown Flood, David McCullough
presents a very disturbing story of hubris, arrogance, and incompetence.
The dam had been left untended since 1857 and had broken open in 1862.213
Right after purchasing the emptied reservoir, the club rebuilt the dam and
reservoir-without the help of any engineers2'-and generated anxiety in
the town below. 5 The valley had witnessed dam failures caused by
flooding in 1808, 1847, and 1880, and endured severe flooding in 1885,
1887, and 1888.216 In 1880, an engineer warned the club that its repairs
were "unsubstantial ... , leaving a large leak, which appears to be cutting
the new embankment," and that the lack of a drainage pipe prevented
the club from regulating the water's height.21 7 He noted that a break
would produce "considerable damage" through the valley below, and
recommended "a thorough overhauling" and the construction of "an ample
discharge pipe to reduce or remove the water to make necessary repairs." 21 8
Despite these numerous warning signs, the club president ignored the
recommendations. 2 9 Even though the dam began to sag in the center, and
even though the water levels rose to unsafe levels,2 the club did little to
maintain or monitor the dam.221
On May 31, 1889, the dam in the mountains collapsed under a torrential
storm and unleashed 20,000,000 tons of water, tearing through the valley at
100 miles per hour.222 In one of the most devastating man-made disasters in
American history, the Flood completely destroyed the town, killing 2000
people223 and causing $17 million in property damage.224 One day later,
reporters from New York to Chicago22 flocked to Johnstown, and
newspapers around the country issued daily reports of the death toll and
211. Id. at 57.
212. Id. at 58-59.
213. Id. at 54.
214. Id. at 55,247.
215. Id. at 63-65.
216. Id. at 65.
217. Id. at 73.
218. Id. at 74.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 76-77.
221. Id. at247.
222. See DISASTER, supra note 209, at 18.
223. Id. at 36.
224. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 210, at 264.
225. Id. at 205-08, 215, 218 (listing the Philadelphia Press and Record, five Pittsburgh
papers, six New York papers, the Chicago Inter-Ocean, the Associated Press, and national
magazines, including Harper's Weekly).
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damage. The Flood turned into "the biggest news story since the murder of
Abraham Lincoln." 226 On June 3, President Harrison called upon the nation
to assist Johnstown, and the governors of Pennsylvania and New York also
pleaded for support.227 The journalists' horrific tales of death and
destruction, 22' also recounted in several books within two years of the
flood,229 evoked sympathy and charity from every region of the country and
around the world: "the greatest outpouring of popular charity the country
had ever seen." 230
As the cause of the dam collapse became clearer, the public focused its
anger on the South Fork Club and its wealthy members.
2 ' The nation
turned its attention to the club's membership list, and expected the club
members to compensate the Johnstown victims.2
32 The club made a modest
donation, but its incredibly wealthy members donated only trivial amounts
to the town, and also tactlessly denied any responsibility to the newspapers.
Their dismissive response stoked the public's anger and provoked a violent
mob's attack on the club.233 A county commission quickly investigated the
dam, and on June 7 it announced:
[W]e find the owners .. .culpable in not making [the dam] as
secure as it should have been, especially in view of the fact that a
population of many thousands were in the valley below; and we
hold that the owners are responsible for the fearful loss of life and
property .... 234
A New York World headline screamed, "THE CLUB IS GUILTY,"
235 and
the Chicago Herald proclaimed that there was "no question whatever" that
the dam collapse involved criminal negligence.236 An expert journal,
Engineering News, concluded that the club constructed the dam "with
226. Id. at 203.
227. WILLIS FLETCHER JOHNSON, HISTORY OF THE JOHNSTOWN FLOOD 249, 260-61
(Philadelphia, Edgewood Pub'g Co. 1889).
228. See, for example, articles published in the N.Y. SUN, June 1-2, 1889, and N.Y. WORLD,
June 2, 1889, which are reprinted in DISASTER, supra note 209, at 18-36.
229. E.g., DAVID J. BEALE, THROUGH THE JOHNSTOWN FLOOD (Boston, Philadelphia,
Hubbard Bros. 1890); HERMAN DIECK, THE JOHNSTOWN FLOOD (Philadelphia, n.p. 1889);
JOHNSON, supra note 227; J.J. MCLAUR1N, THE STORY OF JOHNSTOWN (Harrisburg, James M.
Place 1890).
230. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 210, at 224-25; see also JOHNSON, supra note 227, at 266-80
(noting donations from twenty-five states, and from London, Germany, Belfast, and Turkey). The
donations totaled almost $4 million in cash, plus food and other necessities. MCCULLOUGH, supra
note 210, at 225.
231. Id. at 237.
232. See id. at 241.
233. Id. at 241-43, 255.
234. Id. at 246.
235. The Club Is Guilty, N.Y. WORLD, June 7, 1889, cited in McCULLOUGH, supra note 210,
at 246.
236. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 210, at 246.
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slight care" and "[n]egligence," and condemned the club for hiring no
engineers and no trained inspectors.237 The media and the public vilified the
millionaire club members and demanded compensation. The New York
Times, which had earlier reported the condemning commission report,
editorialized, "I[J]ustice is inevitable even though the horror is attributable
to men of wealth and station, and the majority of the victims the most
downtrodden workers in any industry in the country."238
However, justice did not prevail. Several families and businessmen
sued the club, but all the legal efforts failed. While the true challenge seems
to have been the difficulty of piercing the corporate veil, McCullough's
account suggests that the public and the media perceived that fault rules
prevented recovery.2 9 Just as the Rylands trial court in England had
revealed the shortcomings and abuses of negligence rules, the Johnstown
Flood also focused attention on the faults of the fault doctrine.
The impact of the Johnstown Flood is even clearer when compared to
the English dam failures of the 1850s and 1860s that led to the Rylands
decision.' Whereas the English dam failures drowned a total of 348
people," the Johnstown Flood killed more than 2000 and destroyed an
entire town. Whereas the English dams served important industrial
purposes, the South Fork dam merely created a playground for America's
wealthiest capitalists. In England and the United States, negligence rules
prevented recovery, and as A.W. Brian Simpson demonstrates, the English
system responded by adopting strict liability. American courts would follow
the same legal course in the 1890s and after.
The Johnstown disaster made a long-lasting and widespread impression
on American courts. For more than twenty years, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court found itself immersed in cases involving the Johnstown Flood: the
town's destruction;242 the flood victims; 24 3 destroyed roads, railways, canals,
and bridges;2' other property loss;24 and the relief effort.2" Maryland's
237. Id. at 247.
238. Id. at 254.
239. See id. at 258-59 (noting how the victims' lawyers and the media stressed the difficulty
of proving individual negligence).
240. See supra Section llI.A.
241. Simpson, supra note 1, at 221, 226.
242. Long v. Penn. Ry., 23 A. 459, 460 (Pa. 1892).
243. In re Gaffney's Estate, 23 A. 163 (Pa. 1892); Overbeck v. Overbeck, 25 A. 646 (Pa.
1893); In re Ree's Estate, 92 A. 126, 127 (Pa. 1914).
244. Maneval v. Township of Jackson, 21 A. 672, 673 (Pa. 1891); Lang v. Penn. Ry., 26 A.
370, 371 (Pa. 1893); Jones v. Penn. Canal Co., 35 A. 925, 925 (Pa. 1896); Brown v. Pine Creek
Ry., 38 A. 401,401 (Pa. 1897); Saylor v. Penn. Canal Co., 38 A. 598, 598 (Pa. 1897); Silliman v.
Whitmer, 46 A. 489, 490 (Pa. 1900); Book v. Penn. Ry., 56 A. 352, 354 (Pa. 1903); Braine v. N.
Cent. Ry., 66 A. 985,985 (Pa. 1907).
245. Elder v. Lykens Valley Coal Co., 27 A. 545, 545 (Pa. 1893); Dent v. Huntley, 38 A.
505, 505 (Pa. 1897); Blauch v. Johnstown Water Co., 93 A. 169, 169 (Pa. 1915).
246. Jackson v. Pittsburg Times, 25 A. 613, 613 (Pa. 1893).
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highest court also confronted numerous cases related to the Flood, 7 and
described the event as "[t]he great and disastrous flood which caused such
widespread and appalling destruction."24 Courts around the country
referred to the Johnstown Flood, either in direct discussions of its damage,
or as a paradigmatic catastrophe: New York,24 9 Tennessee, 25 Illinois, 25
Missouri, 2  Texas, 3 West Virginia,2 4 Minnesota,255 Iowa, 6 Kansas, 7
Alabama,"5 and Washington.259 The Illinois Supreme Court even noted a
show entitled "The Johnstown Flood" touring the area in 1905 and 1906.26
The Flood caught the public's attention, and it caught the courts' attention.
D. A Flood of Strict Liability
1. The American Law Review Endorses Rylands
Just two months after the Johnstown Flood, a note in the American Law
Review discussed the horrors of the Johnstown Flood, and then focused on
the courts' tendency to abuse fault rules and on the superiority of Rylands v.
Fletcher.261 The American Law Review was a bimonthly publication
regarded as "the most influential legal periodical of the nineteenth
century," 262 and its notes were not student pieces, but were legal comments
written by perhaps the most "distinguished... group of working editors"
in the history of legal publishing.263 In the Review's early years, its editorial
staff resembled an all-star team of legal scholars and practitioners,
247. State v. Brown, 21 A. 374, 375 (Md. 1891) (destroyed canal); Cowman v. Rogers, 21 A.
64, 65 (Md. 1891) (deaths of two parents and two children); Piedmont & Cumberland Ry. v.
McKenzie, 24 A. 157, 157-58 (Md. 1892) (destroyed bridge); Sentman v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry.,
27 A. 1074 (Md. 1893) (damages to property from flood); Shaw v. Davis, 28 A. 619, 623 (Md.
1894) (destroyed road); State v. Cowen, 35 A. 354, 367 (Md. 1896) (damage to canal).
248. The Canal Company's Case, 35 A. 161 (Md. 1896).
249. Stone v. State, 33 N.E. 733, 734 (N.Y. 1893).
250. Adams Express Co. v. Jackson, 21 S.W. 666, 667 (Tenn. 1893).
251. Wald v. Pittsburg, Chi., Cincinnati & St. Louis Ry. 44 N.E. 888, 889 (I11. 896).
252. Kansas City v. Bacon, 48 S.W. 860, 876 (Mo. 1898); Supreme Council of Royal
Arcanum v. Kacer, 69 S.W. 671, 676 (Mo. Ct. App. 1902) (Bland, P.J., concurring).
253. Males v. Sovereign Camp Woodmen of the World, 70 S.W. 108, 109 (Tex. Civ. App.
1902).
254. UHL v. Ohio River R.R., 49 S.E. 378, 384-85 (W. Va. 1904).
255. Bibb Broom Corn Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 102 N.W. 709, 711 (Minn.
1905).
256. Green-Wheeler Shoe Co. v. Chi. R.I. & P. Ry., 106 N.W. 498,498 (Iowa 1906).
257. Rodgers v. Mo. Pac. Ry., 88 P. 885,890 (Kan. 1907).
258. Ala. Great So. R.R. v. J.A. Elliott & Son, 43 So. 738, 739 (Ala. 1907).
259. State ex rel. Golden Valley Irrigation Co. v. Superior Court, 122 P. 19, 22 (Wash. 1912)
(Chadwick, J., concurring).
260. Merle v. Beifeld, 114 N.E. 369, 378 (I11. 1916).
261. Note, The Law of Bursting Reservoirs, 23 AM. L. REv. 643 (1889).
262. THOMAS A. WOXLAND & PATTI J. OGDEN, LANDMARKS IN AMERICAN LEGAL
PUBLISHING 48 (1989).
263. ERWIN C. SURRENCY, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW PUBLISHING 192 (1990).
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including Oliver Wendell Holmes, Arthur Sedgwick, John C. Ropes, and
John C. Gray.2'6 In 1889, when this note appeared, the editorial board
included Leonard A. Jones, whose index of legal periodicals continues to
guide researchers today. With its articles, law reports, digests, notes, and
book notices, the American Law Review "earned... a large measure of
influence, and its value to lawyers as an organ worthy to represent them,
can hardly be over-estimated." 265
The note The Law of Bursting Reservoirs begins with an extended
introduction about the destructive force of water. The prime example is the
Johnstown Flood, which still left the writer's "legal mind... all in a whirl"
two months afterward.266 Commenting with understatement that "water can
do a great deal of mischief," the writer refers to the Johnstown Flood's
aftermath: a pile of "a great mass of earth, stones, trees, houses, railway
locomotives, cars, human bodies, and what not... very deep and... very
solid."'2 67 From this recounting of the disaster, the writer moves
immediately to the legal question of negligence versus strict liability. He
acknowledges that the jury would probably be able to negotiate around the
negligence rule and find the defendants liable, if only a judge would let it
actually hear the case. "But unfortunately we have judges who think that,
on questions of ordinary care and questions of what is reasonable in
practical life, one legal scholar (although a poor one) knows more than
twelve practical men in the jury box." '268 According to the author, the
problem of the negligence rule was less a doctrinal issue than a question of
institutional abuse. Judges were apparently manipulating the fault rule to
enter summary judgments for defendants or to instruct juries unfairly
against plaintiffs.
The note then offers Fletcher v. Rylands as "[t]he best answer which
has ever yet been given," and which had been "adopted by several
American courts, though denied by some."269 The note focuses not upon the
question of strict liability, but on Justice Blackburn's ruling that the
possession of mischievous or perilous things creates a prima facie case for
damages.270 The advantage of Rylands is that it shifts the power from judge
to jury to apply its common sense and to decide what is the proper duty of
care and what is an act of God. The author's language about the jury
interpreting "reasonable care" suggests that he is not interpreting Rylands
264. American Law Periodicals, 2 ALBANY L.J. 445, 449 (1870). For a discussion of the
significance of these editors, see SURRENCY, supra note 263, at 192. Another publication
described this group as "illustrious." WOXLAND & OGDEN, supra note 262, at 48.
265. American Law Periodicals, supra note 264, at 447.
266. Note, supra note 261, at 646.
267. Id. at 646.
268. Id. at 646-47.
269. Id. at 647.
270. Id.
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as a doctrine of truly strict liability, but, in a passage full of contempt for
the club members, he explains how Rylands places the burden on the
defendant and shifts the question more to causation:
It is good enough for the practical purpose of charging with
damages a company of gentlemen who have maintained a vast
reservoir of water behind a rotten dam, for the mere pleasure of
using it for a fishing pond, to the peril of thousands of honest
people dwelling in the valley below. It is enough that they are
prima facie answerable. That takes the question to the jury. The
jury will do the rest. They can be safely trusted to say whether or
not it was the plaintiff's default, that is the fault of some poor
widow in Johnstown, whose husband and children were drowned
while she was cast ashore and suffered to live.
271
According to the note, once Rylands creates a prima facie case, the jury
should recast the question as assigning moral and causal responsibility. The
author then reformulates the defense of vis major or "act of God." While
the judge may have a certain expansive notion of an act of God, the author
recognizes that "a jury of Pennsylvania Lutherans, Reformed Dutch,
Presbyterians, Methodists, Baptists, or Catholics[] will not take readily to
the attempt to cast the responsibility of such a catastrophe from the
shoulders of the fine rich gentlemen who owned the fish pond and the
rotten dam, to the shoulders of God." 272 The author understands that a jury,
if given a chance to hear these kinds of cases, will be guided by its own
sense of outrage and morals, and will apply a standard that is effectively
strict liability. The author concludes that if this case ever went to a jury, the
members of the South Fork Fishing Club would be in serious trouble. But
this case never went to trial, and the American Law Review note seems to
suggest that the fault doctrine thwarted justice. Just as no English court ever
actually applied strict liability to the fatal reservoir failures of 1853 or 1864,
no court ever applied Rylands to the would-be case of Johnstown v. South
Fork Fishing Club. However, courts in Pennsylvania and around the United
States began applying Rylands to a wide range of other cases.
2. Pennsylvania
Soon after the Flood, courts across the country, particularly in the East,
embraced Rylands. While the Pennsylvania courts never explicitly adopted
Rylands, they adopted its rule on unnatural use very soon after the
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activities over the next three decades.273 In 1886, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court strained itself in Sanderson274 to repudiate Rylands. The court
referred to mine-water runoff or to mining in general as "natural" twenty-
six times,275 a mantra used to distinguish Sanderson's case from Rylands,
though it ignored the role of powerful engines and "an artificial water-
course" in creating the runoff.276 Even though the court ruled that Rylands
was inapplicable to such "natural" activities, it still took the opportunity to
attack Rylands, declaring that Rylands had been rejected in America and
that its rule was "arbitrary." 277 Finally, the court emphasized the economic
significance of the state's coal industry:
[M]ere private personal inconveniences, arising in this way and
under such circumstances, must yield to the necessities of a great
public industry, which, although in the hands of a private
corporation, subserves a great public interest. To encourage the
development of the great natural resources of a country trifling
inconveniences to particular persons must sometimes give way to
the necessities of a great community.27
Before the Flood, the court emphasized the "great public interest" of
industry's unfettered development, and denigrated the "mere personal
inconveniences" caused by industrial damage.
The Flood swept in a new attitude toward big industry and liability. In
Robb v. Carnegie Bros. ,279 an 1891 case involving Andrew Carnegie, the
most prominent figure connected to the Flood, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court applied strict liability to a basic and necessary function in the
manufacturing of coal. The plaintiff's counsel cited Fletcher v. Rylands and
argued that this damage, unlike the mine-water in Sanderson, was not from
a "natural product," but rather was "brought" to the defendants'
property.280 The case was first argued on October 5, 1889, just five months
after the Johnstown Flood.
The court applied strict liability in a unanimous decision, with three of
the Sanderson judges changing their pre-Flood stance.28 One of these
judges was Judge Clark, the author of Sanderson, whose home was in
273. See Note, The Absolute Nuisance Theory in Pennsylvania, 95 U. PA. L. REv. 781, 783-
85(1947).
274. Sanderson 111, 6 A. 453 (Pa. 1886).
275. Id. at 456.
276. IL at 454.
277. Id. at 462-63.
278. Id. at 459.
279. 22 A. 649 (Pa. 1891).
280. Robb v. Carnegie Bros. & Co., 145 Pa. 324, 336 (1891).
281. Id. The reversing judges were Clark, Green, and Paxson.
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western Pennsylvania near Johnstown.282 The Robb ruling limited "natural
activities" to the natural "develop[ment of] the resources of his property,"
which sharply distinguished Sanderson.283 The key distinction between
Sanderson and Robb rested on the natural/unnatural dichotomy: Coal
mining itself was natural, but any further development or manufacturing of
the coal was not natural."' Robb further eviscerated Sanderson in reversing
Sanderson's dicta about the supreme importance of industrial development:
[Tihe production of iron or steel or glass or coke, while of great
public importance, stands on no different ground from any other
branch of manufacturing, or from the cultivation of agricultural
products. They are needed for use and consumption by the public,
but they are the results of private enterprise, conducted for private
profit and under the absolute control of the producer. He may
increase his business at will, or diminish it. He may transfer it to
another person, or place, or state, or abandon it. He may sell to
whom he pleases, at such price as he pleases, or he may hoard his
productions, and refuse to sell to any person or at any price. He is
serving himself in his own way, and has no right to claim
exemption from the natural consequences of his own act. The
interests in conflict in this case are therefore not those of the public
and of an individual, but those of two private owners who stand on
equal ground as engaged in their own private business.285
The unanimous court's depiction of the industrialist as tremendously
powerful, capricious, and manipulative-and deserving of no special
protection from the court-stands in remarkable contrast to the court's dicta
in Sanderson extolling the public service of the capitalists. In Sanderson,
Justice Clark wrote that mining was responsible for the region's prosperity,
and that the plaintiffs assumed the risks of coal mining by moving into coal
country." 6 However, in Robb, the court gave the Carnegie Company no
privileges for enriching the region. And interestingly, the Robb court easily
could have applied the same "assumption of risk" rule to the plaintiff, who
had knowingly bought land adjacent to the Carnegie coke ovens (albeit
before they were expanded significantly). He had even helped construct
some of the ovens as a paid contractor.2"7 Surely, then, the Pennsylvania
282. See SMULL'S LEGISLATIVE HANDBOOK 351 (Thomas B. Cochran ed., Harrisburg, E.K.
Meyers 1887).
283. Robb, 22 A. at 650-51.
284. Id. ("But the defendants are not developing the minerals in their land or cultivating its
surface .... The injury, if any, resulting from the manufacture of coke at this site, is in no sense
the natural and necessary consequence of the exercise of the legal rights of the owner to develop
the resources of his property ... .
285. Id. at651.
286. Sanderson 111, 6 A. 453, 464-65 (Pa. 1886).
287. See Robb, 145 Pa. at 324.
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Supreme Court could have condemned him for turning around a few years
later and suing the Carnegie Company for pollution he not only was aware
of, but also helped to create. The most apparent cause for the sudden
change in the justices' suppositions about industry and the individual
homeowner was the Johnstown Flood.
The American Law Register, which soon after became the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review, announced the significance of the Robb decision
in 1892, and presented it as an American version of Rylands. The Register
first printed the entire decision and then offered seven pages of
commentary. After emphasizing Justice Williams's dicta that the conflict is
not between the private landowner plaintiff and the public good, but rather
between two private owners "who stand on equal ground," the commentary
then linked Robb to Rylands: "The reason for this decision is well
expressed in the judgment of the Exchequer Chamber in Fletcher v.
Rylands.""25  The author then cited a long passage from Judge Blackburn's
opinion and statements from Lord Cranworth and Lord Cairns, and
explained that Robb, which reasons that "a use of land to be a natural use
must have a necessary connection with the soil or the subjacent strata," is
in harmony with the opinions in Rylands.2t 9 Contemporary scholarship
therefore understood Robb essentially as an adoption of Rylands.
Three months later, in Lentz v. Carnegie Bros.,29 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court again ruled unanimously against the Carnegie Company,
holding it liable without fault for damages caused by the same coke works.
In 1893, the court similarly distinguished Sanderson by unanimously
finding the storage of oil unnatural and subject to strict liability. 29' The
author of this opinion had been one of the Sanderson majority, but now he
sharply limited Sanderson to the "necessary" and "essential" development
of "the land itself."292 Throughout the 1890s and the first two decades of
the 1900s, the court in more than a dozen cases continued to carve away at
Sanderson and applied strict liability to more and more hazardous
industries. 293 During this period, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared
288. George Wharton Pepper, The Natural Use of Land: Robb v. Carnegie, 40 AM. L. REG.
26, 39 (1892).
289. Id. at 40. Rylands, Robb, and Sanderson are consistent with the principle that unnatural
use of land creates liability, but the commentary then addressed the converse question: Is natural
use a defense against liability? The common law rule has two parts: "(1) the use of land must be
natural; (2) the agency which transports the injurious substance from its original position to the
plaintiff's property must also be natural." Id. at 41. The author suggested that Pennsylvania was a
lone exception to this doctrine, with a different second step: "[T]he act causing the damage to the
plaintiff should be necessary to the use." Id. at 43.
290. 23 A. 219 (Pa. 1892).
291. Hauck v. Tide Water Pipe-Line Co., 26 A. 644, 644-45 (Pa. 1893); see also Gavigan v.
Atl. Ref. Co., 40 A. 834, 835 (Pa. 1898).
292. Hauck, 26 A. at 646.
293. See Evans v. Reading Chem. Fertilizing Co., 28 A. 702 (Pa. 1894) (per curiam); Good
v. City of Altoona, 29 A. 741 (Pa. 1894); Hindson v. Markle, 33 A. 74, 76 (Pa. 1895);
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and repeated that Sanderson "has never been and never ought to be
extended beyond the limitations put upon it by its own facts.""
3. Other States
Eighteen months after the Johnstown Flood swept into its own
riverways, Maryland's highest court adopted Rylands in Susquehanna
Fertilizer Co. v. Malone.295 Three years later, the court applied Rylands to a
large collection of water that had escaped. 296 Ohio's switch on Rylands also
corresponds intriguingly to the Johnstown Flood. One month before the
Flood, Ohio's supreme court cited Losee v. Buchanan and Marshall v.
Welwood in requiring proof of fault for an exploding boiler.297 However, in
January 1891, a year and a half after the Flood, Ohio adopted Rylands in a
case of flooding caused by a coal company.298 In a defiant stance similar to
Pennsylvania's, the Ohio court declared that mining was unnatural and
"destructive." 2  From this beginning, Ohio then applied Rylands to a series
of industrial "non-natural uses.""
Other states also adopted Rylands in the 1890s. Vermont adopted
Rylands in 1892, when a railway company diverted a river and flooded the
neighboring land.3°' Two years later, South Carolina relied upon Rylands in
finding a mill owner liable for noxious gases, declaring that Losee's
dismissal of Rylands was "incorrect[]." 30 2 In 1893, the Oregon Supreme
Court applied Rylands in enjoining the construction of a dam because of
fears of flooding.3"3 In addition, five other states3" accepted or leaned
toward Rylands in the 1890s. 5
Commonwealth v. Russell, 33 A. 709 (Pa. 1896); Robertson v. Youghiogheny River Coal Co., 33
A. 706 (Pa. 1896); Gavigan, 40 A. 834; Keppel v. Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co., 50 A. 302 (Pa.
1901); Campbell v. Bessemer Coke Co., 23 Pa. Super. 374, 380 (1903); Sullivan v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Co., 57 A. 1065 (Pa. 1904); Green v. Sun Co., 32 Pa. Super. 521 (1907); Vautier v.
Ad. Ref. Co., 79 A. 814 (Pa. 1911); Welsh v. Kerr Coal Co., 82 A. 495 (Pa. 1912); Mulchanock v.
Whitehall Cement Mfg., 98 A. 554 (Pa. 1916).
294. Sullivan, 57 A. at 1068. Contra Harvey v. Susquehanna Co., 50 A. 770 (Pa. 1902).
Pennsylvania eventually distanced itself from Rylands and reembraced Sanderson in the midst of
World War I and the conservative 1920s. See Alexander v. Wilkes-Barre Anthracite Coal Co.,
98 A. 794, 795-96 (Pa. 1916); Householder v. Quemahoning Coal Co., 116 A. 40,41 (Pa. 1922).
295. 20 A. 900,900-01 (Md. 1890).
296. Baltimore Breweries' Co. v. Ranstead, 28 A. 273, 274 (Md. 1894).
297. Huff v. Austin, 21 N.E. 864, 865 (Ohio 1889).
298. Columbus & H. Coal & Iron Co. v. Tucker, 26 N.E. 630, 633 (Ohio 1891).
299. Id. at 632.
300. See supra Section II.C.
301. Gilson v. Del. & Hudson Canal Co., 26 A. 70 (Vt. 1892).
302. Frost v. Berkeley Phosphate Co., 20 S.E. 280, 284 (S.C. 1894).
303. Esson v. Wattier, 34 P. 756 (Or. 1893).
304. Those states were Colorado, Missouri, Wyoming, Kansas, and Utah. See supra Section
I.D. for complete citations. The Colorado Supreme Court had already adopted Rylands in 1887,
and it announced its adherence to the precedent again in 1893. Sylvester v. Jerome, 34 P. 760, 762
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4. New York and New Jersey Waver
In the 1890s, the name "Rylands" surprisingly began to creep into the
decisions of two of the most widely recognized Rylands-resisters: New
York and New Jersey.3" Just two months before the Johnstown Flood, a
New York court cited Losee, holding that a nonnegligent dam break would
impose no liability on the dam's owner." 7 But one year after the Flood,
another New York court creatively flipped around Losee by applying strict
liability for allowing large amounts of water to collect in its ditches.30 8 The
court cited a section of an opinion of Vanderwiele v. Taylor,3" which was
written by Judge Earl, the author of Losee, and which was based on
Losee.310 This passage distinguished the exploding boiler from Rylands's
unnatural water use, "where the owners of lands brought or gathered upon
their land unusual quantities of water, which escaped and caused injury."31
The Superior Court then employed this distinction against Judge Earl and in
favor of Rylands, by finding that the railroad company had gathered
unusual amounts of water and should be held strictly liable. In the same
year, the New York Court of Appeals delivered a now famous precedent
establishing strict liability for nuisance in Bohan v. Port Jervis Gas-Light
Co.
312
In 1895, Judge Peckham recognized Rylands as a valid authority, but
distinguished it from a gas explosion, since gas was ordinary and
"universally used. 31 3 In 1898, Rylands turned up in a dissenting opinion
arguing for liability for the growth of poison ivy-even though the ivy
(Colo. 1893); see also Larimer County Ditch Co. v. Zimmerman, 34 P. 1111, 1112 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1893).
305. In 1890, Indiana recognized Rylands as a valid precedent, but only for establishing that
an owner was not liable for an attack by his cow. Klenberg v. Russell, 25 N.E. 596, 596 (Ind.
1890). This Note therefore does not include this case as adopting or leaning. The court cited
Rylands as an authority, and quoted Justice Blackburn's opinion that an owner of "tame beasts" is
liable "for the grass they eat and trample upon, though not for any injury to the person of others,
for our ancestors have settled that it is not the general nature of horses to kick, or bulls to gore."
Id. (citing Fletcher v. Rylands, 1 L.R.-Ex. 265,280 (Ex. Ch. 1866) (Blackburn, J.)).
306. This shift is surprising because Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476 (1873), and Marshall v.
Welwood, 38 N.J.L. 339 (1876), are two of the most often cited rejections of Rylands. See supra
Section I.B.
307. McKee v. Delaware & H. Canal Co., 4 N.Y.S. 753 (App. Div. 1889).
308. Deigleman v. New York L. & W. Ry., 12 N.Y.S. 83 (Sup. Ct. 1890). In Cosulich v.
Standard Oil Co., 25 N.E. 259, 259-60 (N.Y. 1890), however, the New York Court of Appeals
relied upon Losee v. Buchanan in another boiler explosion case and required proof of fault for
recovery.
309. 65 N.Y. 341 (1875).
310. Id. at 348.
311. Deigleman, 12 N.Y.S. at 85 (quoting Vanderweile, 65 N.Y. at 347).
312. 25 N.E. 246 (N.Y. 1890). The importance of this case is demonstrated by its inclusion in
torts casebooks, such as SHULMAN ET AL., supra note 57, at 71.
313. Schmeer v. Gaslight Co., 42 N.E. 202, 205 (N.Y. 1895).
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naturally grew on the land.3"4 Though this citation was a misapplication of
the rule, it indicates that the judges believed that Rylands was a valid
precedent, and some invoked it quite liberally. After the turn of the century,
Rylands continued to find its way into New York rulings that established
strict liability for ice falling from a tower,' and for the "artificial
accumulation of water." 316 However, Rylands disappeared from New York
opinions after 1908."'7
New Jersey followed a similar path in its brief recognition of Rylands.
Less than three years before the Johnstown Flood, New Jersey's Court of
Chancery cited Sanderson v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., and held that mining
was "natural." 31 But six years after the Flood, in a case of a mining
company polluting a stream, the Court of Chancery launched into an
adamant rejection of Sanderson.319 The court noted that Sanderson was
"inharmonious" with other Pennsylvania precedents, that it "has not
been ... followed in any other state,-certainly not in this state," that the
doctrine has not "ever had the least foothold in this state," and that "[i]t
was repudiated in Ohio, whose mining interests are quite large, in the recent
and well-considered case of [Columbus] Iron Co. v. Tucker."" 0 The court
also cited Rylands32t and enjoined the mining company from polluting the
stream. 322 One year later, New Jersey's highest appellate court affirmed this
decision. 23 In 1899, the Court of Chancery extensively quoted Beach's
holding that mining was unnatural, including Beach's citations to Rylands
and Columbus Iron Co. v. Tucker, and granted an injunction against the
municipality of Paterson against polluting the Passaic River with sewage.324
New Jersey's brief acceptance of Rylands starting in 1895 suggests that its
courts were not directly reacting to Johnstown, but rather were following
314. George v. Cypress Hills Cemetery, 52 N.Y.S. 1097, 1103 (App. Div. 1898) (Woodward,
J., dissenting).
315. Davis v. Niagara Falls Tower Co., 64 N.E. 4, 5 (N.Y. 1902) (citing Shipley v. Fifty
Assocs., 106 Mass. 194 (1869)). Counsel for the plaintiff had cited Shipley and Rylands jointly
in his arguments. Davis v. Niagara Falls Tower Co., 171 N.Y. 336, 336 (1902).
316. Duerr v. Consol. Gas Co. 83 N.Y.S. 714, 718 (App. Div. 1903). Another New York
opinion cited a passage of Rylands in support of the "ordinary" use of land, with the implication
that an owner would be liable for extraordinary and unnatural use. Tucker v. Mack Paving Co., 70
N.Y.S. 688, 693 (App. Div. 1901).
317. E.g., McNulty v. Ludwig & Co., 109 N.Y.S. 703, 703 (App. Div. 1908). In McNulty,
plaintiff's council cited Rylands together with Shipley v. Fifty Associates, 101 Mass. 251 (1869),
one of the early adoptions of Rylands that imposed strict liability for ice falling from a steep roof.
The court then cited Shipley, not Rylands, and distinguished the accident in Shipley from a sign
falling from a building's entrance in McNulty. The court then required proof of negligence.
McNulty, 109 N.Y.S. at 703.
318. Ex'rs of Lord v. Carbon Iron Mfg. Co., 6 A. 812, 813, 825-26 (N.J. 1886).
319. Beach v. Sterling Iron & Zinc Co., 33 A. 286 (N.J. Ch. 1895).
320. Id. at 288-89.
321. Id. at 289.
322. Id. at 293.
323. Sterling Iron & Zinc Co. v. Sparks Mfg. Co., 41 A. 1117, 1117 (N.J. 1896).
324. Grey v. Mayor of Paterson, 42 A. 749, 752 (N.J. Ch. 1899).
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the post-Johnstown shift by other states. New Jersey's weak commitment to
Rylands is demonstrated by the state's drifting back to rejecting Rylands in
1903,32 and its disapproval thereafter.
3 26
E. Rylands and Dam Failures in Texas
The timing of Texas's shift to Rylands also corresponds with dam
construction and failure. After 1880, waterpower and dam construction
became increasingly widespread through the South, as well as the rest of
the country.3 27 In 1893, the state government of Texas constructed near
Austin one of the largest dams in the world, spanning 1091 feet.
Unfortunately, severe design miscalculations became obvious soon after
completion. The volume of available upstream storage "fell far below
expectations," creating a "serious shortfall in capacity" of the project.328
After the dam's completion, there was one initial failure in the dam's
foundation, and leakage and other engineering problems continued for
years. Then a flood in April 1900 swept out half of the dam, drowning eight
people.3 29 After this tragedy, Texas abandoned the project for forty years.
While scholars point to Texas as a prominent rejecting state,330 the
state's courts actually moved toward Rylands during this period. In 1899, in
the midst of the Austin Dam's engineering troubles, but just before its final
collapse, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals cited the American line of
Rylands cases and Rylands-like cases in holding a reservoir owner liable
without fault for the damage caused by its overflow,' and in upholding
this decision one year later, the same court added more citations to Rylands
cases. 32 Around the same time, the Texas Supreme Court and a lower court
sharply criticized Rylands,333 so that Texas's courts were split on the matter.
In the 1910s, Texas courts shifted more and more towards Rylands, but
ultimately repudiated the precedent in 1936.334 Texas's mixed rulings on
325. DeGray v. Murray, 55 A. 237, 238 (N.J. 1903).
326. O'Hara v. Nelson, 63 A. 836, 839 (N.J. Ch. 1906); Lightcap v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 101
A. 187 (N.J. 1917).
327. 1 Louis C. HUNTER, A HISTORY OF INDUSTRIAL POWER IN THE UNITED STATES, 1780-
1930, at 242-47 (1979).
328. Id. at 246.
329. Notable Dam Failures of the Past, supra note 194, at 472.
330. E.g., FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 59, at 449-50; KEETON ET AL., supra note 54, at
549; PROSSER, supra note 4, at 151. For Texas adopting nuisance law, see William L. Prosser,
Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEx. L. REV. 399 (1942).
331. Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. O'Mahoney, 50 S.W. 1049 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899).
332. Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. O'Mahoney, 60 S.W. 902 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900).
333. Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. v. Oakes, 58 S.W. 999, 1000 (Tex. 1900); Barnes v.
Zettlemoyer, 62 S.W. 111, 112 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901).
334. In 1915, Texas passed a statute prohibiting the diversion of the natural flow of surface
waters and the impounding of such waters "in such a manner as to damage the property of
another, by the overflow of said water so diverted or impounded." Anderson v. Highland Lake
Co., 258 S.W. 218, 218 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) (citing Act of May 29, 1915, TEX. REv. Civ. STAT.
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Rylands around the time of the Austin Dam's problems and ultimate
collapse, followed years later by unambiguous restrictions on dams and
reservoirs, suggest a link between risky dam construction and the adoption
of Rylands.
After discussing the incredible damage of the Johnstown Flood, one
member of the Washington Supreme Court referred to the reservoir
disasters in both Pennsylvania and Texas. "The [twenty] years between
Johnstown and Austin are dotted thick with similar warnings, men, women,
and children swept away and drowned, property wiped out of existence. At
least 81 dams of considerable size burst, unleashing ruin, during those 20
years." '335 While this pattern of "ruin" did not motivate the State of
Washington to embrace Rylands, the vast majority of states adopted its
strict liability rule, including all of the other state courts that discussed the
Johnstown Flood,336 even if the adoption by Texas and New York was only
temporary. The decade between the Johnstown Flood and the Austin Dam
failure represents a watershed for Rylands.
IV. THE HISTORY OF FAULT AND THE FAULTS OF HISTORY
A. The Dynamics of Legal Change
The current scholarship on Rylands presents two fundamentally
different views on legal change. One view of Rylands's adoption suggests
that American courts responded to broad, long-term social and economic
forces. According to this perspective, the courts at first resisted Rylands for
a "long period" because the country was still developing industrially and
socially, and the courts did not want to hinder that development by
imposing tough liability standards.337 Once the nation had firmly established
its economy sometime in the mid-twentieth century, its courts no longer
needed to subsidize industry and they imposed strict liability.
Another theory, ascribing legal change to the influence of elites and
academics rather than to social forces, contends that the Restatement of
ANN. art. 501 It (Vernon Supp. 1918)). In 1916, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals returned to the
cases that had adopted Rylands, and held the owner of a reservoir, or "artificial lake," liable for
flooding, despite his lack of fault. Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Frazer, 182 S.W. 1161, 1161 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1916) (emphasis added). The court cited Texas & Pacific Railway v. O'Mahoney, 50 S.W.
1049, for rejecting the negligence requirement as "unsound." Frazer, 182 S.W. at 1162. In 1924,
Anderson v. Highland Lake Co. interpreted the 1915 statute as imposing strict liability for the
escape of impounded water. Anderson, 258 S.W. at 218. In 1936, the Texas Supreme Court
rejected Rylands decisively. Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 96 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. 1936).
335. State ex rel. Golden Valley Irrigation Co. v. Superior Court, 122 P. 19, 22 (Wash. 1912)
(Chadwick, J., concurring).
336. See supra text accompanying notes 242-260. Texas and New York are included in this
list, even though they wavered on Rylands and eventually rejected it.
337. See, e.g., KEETON ETAL., supra note 56, at 548.
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Torts in 1938 granted legitimacy to Rylands and turned the tide.338 The first
theory emphasizes economic growth and stability, while the second places
the shift in the midst of economic disaster and instability. The first credits
social and economic forces and the courts' response to them; the second
attributes change to the legitimization offered by legal scholars.
This Note challenges both of these theories. Rylands's adoption
correlated with economic success, but very loosely, and sometimes it
sharply conflicted with economic patterns. The boom of the 1880s led to
only scattered acceptances, and during the collapse of 1890s, courts actually
strengthened Rylands's role in the common law. While its pattern of
acceptance corresponds to national political shifts favoring reform (with
Populism, rather than the New Deal), Rylands also prevailed despite an
even more decisive national turn toward pro-industry conservatism with
McKinley's sweeping victories. The more likely answer for why Rylands
prevailed regardless of economic and political shifts is that a series of
reservoir failures tapped into the public's fears about rampant
industrialization and "non-natural" accidents. This bottom-up social
dynamic challenges both theories' assumptions about the role of courts.
Rather than listening to New Deal lawyers and scholars or reflecting upon
long-term economics, state courts responded most clearly to immediate
tragic events and public outcry. This pattern suggests that the Gilded Age
state courts were much more responsive, fluid, and populist than previously
thought.
This account also connects with a growing body of scholarship
contending that dramatic events produce legal change by making risks more
"salient" for the public.339 Dramatizing the use and abuse of nature, the
Johnstown Flood focused attention on the risks of the industrial age and
how industrialists sometimes failed to account for these risks to the public.
The salience of such dramatic risks connected with an inchoate intuition
that the cheapest cost avoider ought to bear liability.' ° Of course, these
courts never used the phrase "cheapest cost avoider," but some did
emphasize that the producer or owner has control over the hazardous
activity and the choice to reduce or move it. The American Law Review
note that called for the adoption of Rylands in the wake of the Flood
focused on the decision of the South Fork Club to "maintain[] a vast
reservoir of water behind a rotten dam, for the mere pleasure of using it for
338. See Nolan & Ursin, supra note 2, at 258.
339. See, e.g., Roger Noll & James Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for
Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747 (1990) (arguing that many human perceptions of risk are
shaped by "heuristic" short-cuts, such as dramatic events); Carol M. Rose, Environmental
Lessons, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1023, 1026 (1994) (emphasizing that dramatic events, such as the
Bhopal Union Carbide disaster, trigger legal change).
340. See GuIDo CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 135-73 (1970); Guido Calabresi &
John T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1083 (1972).
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fishing pond, to the peril of thousands of honest people dwelling in the
valley below." 34' While the writer was primarily expressing moral outrage,
he was also conveying a belief that an owner has the responsibility to weigh
the benefits against the costs, and to face the consequences for not avoiding
those costs. In Robb v. Carnegie Bros., argued only months after the Flood,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court also emphasized that the producer controls
the risks: "[The producer] may increase his business at will, or diminish it.
He may transfer it to another person, or place, or state, or abandon it." "
This point must not be overstated-these courts did not formulate an
economic model, nor did they articulate the theory explicitly. Nevertheless,
they did have a basic sense that those who created risk had an ability to
reduce risk and had a responsibility for the costs. Each of the historical
trends discussed in this Note contributed to this intuition: Urbanization, side
by side with industry, increased the dangers to residential areas; economic
growth gave the industrialists like Carnegie and Mellon deeper pockets and
more leeway in reducing the risks; and populism shifted the perspective and
sympathized more with those who faced the dangers. However, this
intuition about cost avoidance did not become sufficiently salient until the
Johnstown Flood.
While these tragic events captivated the public and' transformed state
common law, the federal courts generally resisted this change.
3 This
difference suggests that. federal courts' appointed life-term judges were
more resistant to public outcry, while the judges of state courts, many of
whom faced the pressures of reelection, were more attuned to the public
and its fears. In the mid-nineteenth century, a majority of states rewrote
their constitutions to create an elective judiciary,3' and every state that
entered the Union after 1846 established at least a partially elective
judiciary. 45 Almost all of the states that adopted an elective judiciary in this
period also adopted Rylands.34 The discrepancy between elected judges
341. See Note, The Law of Bursting Reservoirs, supra note 261, at 647.
342. 22 A. 649, 651 (Pa. 1891).
343. See supra Section I.D.
344. Between 1846 and 1860, twenty-one states revised their constitutions, and nineteen
adopted an elective judiciary. Kermit Hall, The Judiciary on Trial: State Constitutional Reform
and the Rise of an Elective Judiciary, 1846-1860, 46 HISTORIAN 337, 337-38 (1983); see also
Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the Elective Judiciary in
Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 190 (1993).
345. FRIEDMAN. supra note 1, at 323.
346. Fifteen of the nineteen states that adopted an elective judiciary from 1846 to 1860 also
adopted or leaned toward Rylands before 1911: Minnesota, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana,
Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, California, Kansas, Oregon, and
Wisconsin. Of the four other states to adopt an elective judiciary in this period, New York and
Texas wavered on Rylands in the midst of fears about dam collapses, Virginia adopted Rylands in
1918, and Kentucky was the only one to reject Rylands consistently. Of the states that entered the
Union with an elective judiciary after 1860, five adopted Rylands (Utah, Colorado, Wyoming,
Montana, and Nevada) and only one rejected (Washington). The only two states that convened
constitutional conventions between 1846 and 1860 and retained an appointed judiciary were
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adopting Rylands and appointed judges resisting Rylands may also explain
why the English courts, whose judges are appointed, restricted the
application of Rylands to reservoir accidents.347 The federal resistance to
Rylands also demonstrates the impact of Swift v. Tyson,348 which established
the power of a federal common law removed from state common law, and
the importance of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins349 in resolving these conflicts
and bringing federal common law in line with state common law.
B. The Dynamics of Legal Scholarship
Finally, this Note offers a few brief thoughts about two
historiographical questions, both focusing on the over-conceptualization of
legal scholarship during the twentieth century. First, why did scholars in the
early twentieth century continue to believe that Rylands had been spumed?
Perhaps they relied too heavily on the treatises of earlier scholars, such as
Wharton and Cooley, who wrote after the rejections by New York and New
Hampshire. Courts around the country, however, were aware of the shift to
Rylands in the 1890s and 1900s.3"' Perhaps the scholars had an Eastern bias,
and relied on the rejections of New York's and New Hampshire's
prestigious courts, yet most Eastern states adopted Rylands in the 1890s,
including the wavering of New York and New Jersey. The best explanation
is that these "legal science" scholars were too committed to
conceptualizing law and too enamored with the fault doctrine."' Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Francis Bohlen, Jeremiah Smith, and the "progressive"
scholars had an impulse "to conceptualize law around a series of universal
principles.., from a diverse series of writs," 352 and focused on simplifying
and modernizing tort law. Their self-styled "legal science" of discovering
the common law demanded clean and clear categories. Though Holmes
defended Rylands, his support was overshadowed by his almost universalist
Massachusetts and New Hampshire. Intriguingly, Massachusetts was the first state to adopt
Rylands and never wavered after 1868, while New Hampshire was the most consistent rejecting
state. This pattern suggests that Massachusetts and New Hampshire were the most decisive and
least swayed by political trends and disasters, at least in part because of their appointed judiciary.
For a list of states adopting an elective judiciary, see Hall, supra note 344, at 337-38. For a list of
states adopting Rylands between 1868 and 1911, see Section I.D.
347. See supra notes 186-187 and accompanying text (discussing A.W.B. Simpson's
"new working hypothesis" that Rylands was about the unique features of bursting reservoirs).
The Lord Chancellor, who heads the judiciary in England and Wales, recommends the
highest judicial appointments to the Prime Minister, and lower judicial appointments to the
Crown. He also appoints magistrates directly, not subject to ministerial direction or control.
348. 41 U.S. 1 (1841).
349. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
350. E.g., Beach v. Sterling Iron & Zinc Co., 33 A. 286, 288 (N.J. Ch. 1895) (citing Ohio's
approval of Ryands in the 1890s); Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. O'Mahoney, 50 S.W. 1049, 1052 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1899) (citing California's adoption of Rylands).
351. WHTE, supra note 1, at 12-19.
352. Id. at 18.
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formulation of the fault rule and his condemnation of strict liability as
"offend[ing] the sense of justice." 353 In this way, the conceptualist legal
science approach, which Holmes represents, prevented a closer examination
of the case law's nuances. Furthermore, Smith was a crusader for the fault
doctrine, and Bohlen was a conservative polemicist who attacked the rising
legal realists."M The rejection of Rylands in the 1870s confirmed their
intuitions and served their agenda, so they ignored the sweeping adoption of
Rylands in their time. This failure calls into question the "conceptualist"
scholarship of legal science.
Second, why have modem scholars overlooked the early adoption
of Rylands? They too have over-conceptualized their field into clean
categories. Just as the progressive legal scholars at the turn of the century
sought uniform legal theory and doctrine, modem scholars have
overemphasized uniform legal history. In a seminal piece that is still widely
cited, Charles Gregory divided the last two hundred years of tort law into
relatively clean historical eras: "Trespass to Negligence to Absolute
Liability." 35 The rejection of Rylands fits all too neatly in the middle
phase. Its rejection also fits the historical intuitions and agendas of both left
and right: Richard Posner found a golden age of sound free market
principles prevailing from 1875 to 1905.356 On the other side of the
spectrum, Morton Horwitz perceived the mechanics of the class struggle
and the rise of the bourgeoisie in nineteenth-century law, and probed no
further.357 G. Edward White and Lawrence Friedman also overemphasized
the categories of the era of fault as they, too, commented on Rylands's
rejection." 8
These assumptions have shaped important developments in
constitutional theory as well. With some current scholarship inaccurately
placing the turning point on Rylands around the New Deal, specifically with
the Restatement of Torts in 1938, 3
59 this mistaken conclusion confirms the
prevailing beliefs about the New Deal's deeply transformative legal power
against a resistant judiciary. In their study of the New Deal Court, scholars
have emphasized the tremendous transformation from the laissez-faire
jurisprudence of the Lochner era to the New Deal regulatory era and have
drawn theoretical conclusions from this change.
3' 6 Recently, some scholars
353. See HOLMES, supra note 31, at 77-78.
354. WHrrE, supra note 1, at 38, 78.
355. Gregory, supra note 1.
356. See Posner, supra note 1.
357. HORwrrz, supra note 1.
358. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 425-26; WHrlE, supra note 1, at 16-19, 109-10.
359. See Nolan & Ursin, supra note 2, at 258.
360. See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); 2 BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); see also PAUL R. BENSON, JR., THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, 1937-1970 (1970); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE
SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN RETROSPECT 10-25 (1957); William E.
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have begun to challenge these assumptions.36" ' While the New Deal
unquestionably changed the course of legal and constitutional history,
the fact that American courts actually embraced Rylands more than forty
years before the New Deal demonstrates an earlier, more gradual
transformation-one that underscores the nuances of legal change in
American history. Understandably, historians and constitutional scholars
seek broad trends and must present generalized accounts in order to make
sense of our world, and torts scholars depend upon these generalizations in
order to teach more effectively. However, this reliance on uniformity and
generalized history is the long shadow of the progressive era. With their
historical intuitions affirmed by the early rejection in the 1870s, torts
scholars accepted the conventional wisdom about the Gilded Age courts.
In their current portrayal of nineteenth-century law, torts scholars have
used the rejection of Rylands, along with cases from Brown v. Kendall362 to
Ives v. South Buffalo Railway,363 to demonstrate how American courts
consistently subsidized technology and industry in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. However, the fact that state courts accepted Rylands
offers a different perspective on America's response to the industrial
revolution, when tragic events dramatized the revolution's dark and
destructive side. The adoption of Rylands as a result of these flooding
disasters illustrates that elected state judges were particularly responsive to
popular fears, and suggests that these courts were taking early and
significant steps toward the era of strict liability.
Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt's Supreme Court "Packing " Plan, in ESSAYS ON THE NEW
DEAL 69 (Harold M. Hollingsworth & William F. Holmes eds., 1969).
361. See, e.g., Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the
Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 293 (1985); Barry
Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 201 (1994); William I. Urofsky, Myth
and Reality: The Supreme Court and Protective Legislation in the Progressive Era, 1983 Y.B.
SUP. CT. HIST. SOC. 53. For a particularly insightful reinterpretation of the Lochner Court's
political and ideological origins, see William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor
and the Law in the Gilded Age, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 767.
362. 60 Mass. 292 (1850).
363. 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911).
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